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Abstract 
 
Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons and of these only three have acquired them 
in the past 40 years. The primary reason for this has been the establishment of a powerful 
nuclear non-proliferation regime and its associated norms. The powerful influence of both 
the regime and the resulting norms on state behaviour is unquestionable. However a 
limited amount of state proliferation continues and some states’ behaviour suggests that 
they either reject, or believe that they are outside of the influence of the regime and its 
norms.  
My study is looking at the problem of non-conformity to the non-proliferation norm to see 
why it occurs. The issue is specifically a nuclear one however non-conformity to norms has 
wider implications in the study of international relations (IR). Regimes and norms clearly do 
not exist in a vacuum but operate within an international social environment. This nuclear 
issue remains a central consideration for state foreign policy and hence has justified 
extensive examination in the field of IR. The intellectually and ethically complex issues that 
surround access to this technology were acknowledged from its devastating baptism in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
  
International regulation was seen as the most appropriate form of control of nuclear 
weapons. This was in part due to the potential consequence of the misuse and the impact 
of accidents transcending national boundaries. This ultimate destructive capability has only 
been in the hands of a few states and the dissemination and control of this capability has 
been contentious from the day it was first used. Initially its power came from its potential 
to completely dominate militarily. As soon as the second country gained the same 
capability it became a lot more complicated. The destructive capability of nuclear weapons 
is such that any future war that saw their use could result in the annihilation of the human 
species. The Cold War and its extreme vertical nuclear proliferation actualised this fear. 
 
Nuclear technologies dual purpose functionality, of both peaceful power generation and 
the creation of a military nuclear capability make for a complex situation. There is an 
obvious power imbalance between the nuclear haves and have-nots and a self protective 
desire to stop or at least limit the number of countries attempting to join the ‘nuclear club’.  
iii 
 
Both realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are able to explain, in part, conformity and 
non conformity to regimes and their associated norms within today’s social environment. In 
this study I will use a social constructivist approach, which is based on the outcomes of 
persuasion, identification and social conformity, to see if it can add to the current 
explanations of state nuclear proliferation.  
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Introduction 
 
Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons and of these only three have 
acquired them in the past 40 years. The primary reason for this has been the 
establishment of a powerful nuclear non-proliferation regime and its associated 
norms.
1
 The powerful influence of both the regime and the resulting norms on state 
behaviour is unquestionable. However a limited amount of state proliferation 
continues and some states’ behaviour suggests that they either reject, or believe 
that they are outside of the influence of the regime and its norms.  
My study is looking at the problem of non-conformity to the non-proliferation norm 
to see why it occurs. The issue is specifically a nuclear one however non-conformity 
to norms has wider implications in the study of international relations (IR). Regimes 
and norms clearly do not exist in a vacuum but operate within an international 
social environment.
2
 This nuclear issue remains a central consideration for state 
foreign policy and hence has justified extensive examination in the field of IR. The 
intellectually and ethically complex issues that surround access to this technology 
were acknowledged from its devastating baptism in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
  
International regulation was seen as the most appropriate form of control of nuclear 
weapons. This was in part due to the potential consequence of the misuse and the 
impact of accidents transcending national boundaries. This ultimate destructive 
capability has only been in the hands of a few states and the dissemination and 
control of this capability has been contentious from the day it was first used. Initially 
its power came from its potential to completely dominate militarily. As soon as the 
second country gained the same capability it became a lot more complicated. The 
destructive capability of nuclear weapons is such that any future war that saw their 
use could result in the annihilation of the human species. The Cold War and its 
extreme vertical nuclear proliferation actualised this fear. 
                                                          
1
 Definition of regime is “principals, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors expectations converge in a given issue area” taken from  SD Krasner, "Structural Causes and 
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," International Organization  (1982). 
2
 MR Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to 
Understand Regime Effectiveness," International Studies Review 10, no. 3 (2008). Pgs 424-6.  
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Nuclear technologies dual purpose functionality, of both peaceful power generation 
and the creation of a military nuclear capability make for a complex situation. There 
is an obvious power imbalance between the nuclear haves and have-nots and a self 
protective desire to stop or at least limit the number of countries attempting to join 
the ‘nuclear club’.  
Both realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are able to explain, in part, conformity 
and non conformity to regimes and their associated norms within today’s social 
environment. In this study I will use a social constructivist approach, which is based 
on the outcomes of persuasion, identification and social conformity, to see if it can 
add to the current explanations of state nuclear proliferation.  
 
As part of this study I have selected two case studies; Iran and Israel. I have selected 
these countries because they are both to varying degrees pariahs in the 
international system. By this I mean that they are consistently presented as the 
exception to international norms and because of this they are the state actors that 
directly challenge these norms. Both counties have over time continuously and 
consistently tested the intent and purpose of the non-proliferation regime. These 
countries have, by their actions, also exposed the double standards within the 
regime and the broader international environment. These double standards 
manifest themselves in the inconsistent manner in which different countries are 
treated by members of the international community. What purports to be a 
uniformly applied, transparent and fair system is in reality, as might be expected, 
one that is implemented in a highly subjective manner. This is based on the 
manifestly uneven state power relationships in favour of the nuclear haves over the 
have-nots. 
 
The manner in which these two countries have gone about proliferation has been 
different, their approaches have changed over time, and their motives for doing so 
have also changed. The fluid international environment in which they both operate 
has also changed which has in turn affected some of their reasons for proliferation. 
 
 4
My thesis is divided into four sections; the first section presents an overview of the 
non-proliferation regime and three theoretical explanations for it. The three 
approaches used in my study are; realist, neo-liberal institutionalist, and 
constructivist to see how they explain proliferation. The second and third sections 
are my case studies on Iran and Israel respectively. In these case studies my focus is 
the process by which the states have or are in the process of acquiring nuclear 
weapons and the rationale behind this process. In the fourth section I have applied a 
social constructivist approach to these case studies.  
The conclusion outlines why I believe that a constructivist framework offers useful 
additional tools to explain state proliferation. This approach allows proliferation to 
be examined by looking at the state rationale for the decision not to conform to the 
non-proliferation norms and the regime itself.  
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Nuclear Proliferation Expectations Versus Reality 
 
The purpose of this section is twofold; firstly to present a descriptive outline of the 
non-proliferation regime, defining the different elements that it consists of. 
Secondly to examine three dominant IR paradigms and explain how they attempt to 
explain proliferation and non-proliferation. The three approaches in this paper are 
realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and a social constructivist theory that focuses 
on the international social environment, norms and regimes and how they 
interrelate to shape state behaviour.    
 
The NPT and the wider non-proliferation regime 
 
The non-proliferation regime consists of multiple elements, but it is the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that is at the core of this regime.
3
 This section will 
present an overview of the NPT as well as explaining the relationship it has to the 
other elements of the regime.  
 
The NPT was presented for signing in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. It is an 11 
article treaty which is currently signed by 189 of the 192 recognised sovereign states 
of the world.
4
 Israel, India and Pakistan are the three states that have never been 
signatories and North Korea officially withdrew from it in 2003. The NPT is an 
aspirational treaty in that it not only sets out how to operate in the here and now 
but also includes in article VI, a commitment to ultimately work towards a nuclear 
weapon free world. 
The NPT has effectively categorised states into their current (at the time of the 
original signing of the treaty) nuclear capabilities and laid down a very basic 
framework for the movement between these categories. The NPT was constructed 
with a glass ceiling and it is this ceiling and the inherent difficulty in measuring 
                                                          
3
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (22 April 1970).   
4
 NPT numbers from P Margulies, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Global Issues (facts on File, 2008). Pgs 
231-4. 
 6
state’s proximity to it that is the crux of the ongoing nuclear issue. The NPT’s cut off 
for allowing state possession of nuclear weapons was that they had to be tested 
prior to the first of January 1967.  
 
The Treaty itself does not have any implicit mechanism for its own enforcement and 
does not detail any possible sanctions that can be applied to states that violate it.
5
 
Violations of the NPT are dealt with by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
which has the mandate to enforce sanctions as well as authorise military action 
against states. The UNSC is dominated by its five permanent member states (the P5) 
which were originally selected as a result of the outcome of World War II.
6
 They 
have all subsequently become nuclear weapon states. All of the P5 hold veto power 
for any UNSC resolution, which means a negative vote from any one of the P5 will 
result in a resolution not being passed. The dominance of nuclear weapon states on 
the UNSC   could be seen as undermining the non-proliferation regime. When the P5 
states were initially chosen in 1946 the US was the only one of them to possess 
nuclear weapons.
7
  
 
The NPT is reviewed every five years and was originally drafted to last for 25 years. 
In 1995 after two extensions, it was agreed to extend it indefinitely. As is common 
practice with most international treaties these five yearly reviews provide an 
opportunity for signatories to negotiate interpretive as well as compliance issues. 
The treaty was the culmination of previous failed attempts to contain the growing 
fear of an increasingly nuclear world. The use of nuclear weapons by the US against 
Japan had shown the world their immensely destructive capabilities. This motivated 
the international community to regulate access to them. The subsequent vertical 
nuclear proliferation of the Cold War and the fear that horizontal nuclear 
proliferation would follow added to the impetus for regulation. Events like the 
Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 only emphasised the need for more formal controls 
which the NPT was able to provide. Today the NPT stands alone as the most 
                                                          
5
 KC Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation (Westview Press, 1993). Pg 14. 
6
 The P 5 states are; The United States, Russia, China, France and The United Kingdom.  
7
 Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation. Pg 12. 
 7
internationally supported multilateral treaty dealing with the containment of any 
form of armaments in world history.
8
 The NPT has been the catalyst for the 
establishment of the other non-proliferation components that make up the regime.   
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the body that is charged with 
inspecting national nuclear programmes under the NPT. Its role is to independently 
verify that what states profess to be occurring within their nuclear programmes is in 
fact the case. The way in which the agency does this is referred to as the 
implementation of safeguards. There are two main safeguards. Firstly states are 
required to declare all of their nuclear installations so they can be inspected by the 
IAEA.
9
 Secondly signatories must keep detailed records so that all nuclear fissile 
material can be accounted for. This is to stop the diversion of this material to other 
unsanctioned nuclear (weapon) programmes. 
10
 The IAEA is tasked with referring 
states that do not comply with the safeguards to the UNSC which is mandated to 
administer disciplinary proceedings. The most common form this takes is economic 
sanctions against countries, but could include military action. These disciplinary 
proceedings can only be brought against countries that are signatories of the NPT 
which leaves out Israel, India, Pakistan and since 2003 the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK). The IAEA’s independence and neutrality are essential for 
it to perform these functions. The IAEA has a finite budget and personnel which 
limits its ability to be abreast of every state’s nuclear programmes. The biggest 
limitation of the IAEA is that its role is focused on declared nuclear facilities and the 
verification that what is being stated as happening is in fact occurring. They do not 
have the power to conduct snap inspections, they have to pre schedule any 
inspections which results in them having to operate largely on trust. 
 
                                                          
8
 Rauf, The strengthened NPT review process: legal and diplomatic considerations. Chapter 3 in C 
Ungerer and M Hanson, The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Allen & Unwin in association with 
the Dept. of International Relations, RSPAS, St. Leonards, NSW, Australia, 2001). 
9
 The IAEA has no organic intelligence branch but relies on a mixture of open source research, reports 
from state intelligence agencies (this is often a process of informing on your neighbour or enemy) and 
comparative studies from previous inspections. Recent improvements in commercially available 
satellite photography are also being utilised.   
10
 I Bellany, Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Manchester University Press, 2005). Pgs 76-78. 
 8
Article VII of the NPT allows for the establishment of regional Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zones (NWFZ). These currently exist in The South Pacific, Africa, Latin America 
including the Caribbean and Central Asia. The NWFZ act as another layer of the non-
proliferation regime and hence strengthen its associated norms. The 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in 1996. It was ratified by Russia in 2000, however it has never 
been able to get US Senate approval, so is still remains a work in progress.
11
 
  
The establishment of export control groups was an attempt to firstly define what 
sensitive nuclear equipment was and then regulate its sale. The Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are both examples 
of attempts to put the aims of the NPT ahead of financial profit. The sale of nuclear 
and missile technology is very profitable and the intent behind these two groups is 
to put checks and balances in place as tools for the voluntary regulation of as much 
of this market as possible. The emphasis is on dual use technology, which is 
technology that can have applications for both nuclear power and nuclear weapon 
programmes. The establishment of security assurances from more powerful 
countries with their ‘nuclear umbrellas’ have played a part in removing some of the 
security motivations for states to develop their own nuclear programmes. This was 
the cornerstone of Cold War deterrence strategy and effectively divided the world 
in two as an attack on a state within the umbrella was to be treated the same as an 
attack on the US or the USSR and retaliation was to be expected.  
 
The final component of the regime is the bilateral nuclear disarmament agreements 
between the US and Russia, the two countries with by far the most nuclear 
weapons.
12
 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I and II) and the Strategic 
Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) have both been successful in reducing both the 
number of warheads each state has as well as reducing the level of operational 
preparedness at which these weapons are held.  
                                                          
11
 Margulies, Nuclear Nonproliferation. Pg 32. 
12
 These agreements were entered into with the USSR and after its breakup all of its nuclear weapons 
were concentrated in Russia.    
 9
 
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is centred on the NPT, however, it is more 
than just the NPT. It is the combination of a network of multilateral and bilateral 
agreements, structures and relationships which also include the IAEA, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) and the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
13
 It is the combined effect of these that make up the non-
proliferation regime, and establish and project the non-proliferation norms. The 
network includes a mixture of treaties which are codified into international law, 
agencies that inform on compliance, institutions like the UNSC that adjudicate and 
enforce compliance, as well as voluntary commitments like the NWFZ and NSG. The 
regime is fluid but over time, and especially since the establishment of the NPT, it 
has got stronger and expanded its sphere of influence. Although not all elements of 
the regime always align towards a single objective, they are all focused in one 
direction which is the regulation of nuclear technology. This is achieved through the 
provision of mutual assistance to facilitate signatory states in acquiring nuclear 
power generation if they want it. The by product of this regulated environment is 
the close control of all nuclear technology especially that which is able to be used 
for nuclear weapon production. This regime and the associated norms have a 
symbiotic relationship, shaping, directing and reinforcing but as well have the 
potential to undermine each other. The second part of this section will look at how 
different IR theories attempt to explain non-proliferation and proliferation. 
 
Theoretical explanations for proliferation 
 
Different IR theories attempt to explain nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. 
This section will describe three different such theories. The first two, realist and 
neo-liberal institutionalism, I believe, offer only part of the required explanation for 
these events. The third paradigm comes from the social constructivist school. It 
attempts to explain state nuclear restraint as being a consequence of adherence to 
non-proliferation norms. 
                                                          
13
 MR Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Univ of Georgia Press, 
2009). Pg 38. 
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In any analysis of proliferation and non-proliferation it is important to deconstruct 
the notion of a state as a homogeneous entity for decision making. This is because it 
is almost always a small group of elites that make the decision to acquire a nuclear 
capability. Because this is the case these elites, or decision makers, can be 
persuaded and influenced by other elements. These influences can come from 
internal or external sources or a combination of the two. As regimes evolve, through 
the creation of treaties and agreements they create norms of behaviour that either 
reinforce the regime or undermine it. Limited norms can exist prior to their 
codification within a regime and are either strengthened or weakened by the 
evolving regime.
14
 The three theoretical approaches each provide differing 
perspectives on the role and utility of norms, regimes and the international social 
environment. These differences come from the way in which each views the role 
and motivations of the state operating within the international environment.    
 
Realism 
 
“Our bombs are not just directed to the east but in all directions”.
15
 
 
The realist perspective has predicted a continuing increase in the number of states 
that will acquire nuclear weapons.
16
 This is based on the perception that a states 
security situation will be improved by the possession of nuclear weapons. The 
premise is that the deterrent effect that comes from the possession of nuclear 
weapons cannot be matched by the possession of conventional weapons. The “state 
of anarchy” in which states operate and their primary motivation, self help, will lead 
states to want to acquire whatever it deems as necessary to ensure its survival. 
Because today’s friends can be tomorrow’s enemies it is not prudent to rely on 
security guarantees provided by other states for one’s long term security. It is 
                                                          
14
 Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to 
Understand Regime Effectiveness."Pg 424-426. 
15
 Quote attributed to Charles De Gaulle. 
16
 I am providing an overview of realism which is situated in generalist terms so neo-realism could be 
used interchangeably.  
 11
therefore in the best interest of all states to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. 
The only thing that would stop states doing so would be supply side issues like the 
lack of technology or access to raw materials. States that have the internal capability 
to manufacture nuclear weapons are not looking after their own best interests if 
they don’t do it and should assume everyone else who can, will be doing so.
17
  
 
The non-proliferation regime and especially the NPT could only be considered useful 
if it facilitated access to technology not currently possessed. Once that technology is 
acquired with the associated expertise required to operate it, the realist view is that 
you should leave the NPT and build nuclear weapons. Waltz, goes even further by 
emphasising the utility of a second strike capability and how the possession of one 
will almost rule out the possibility of other states attacking you.
18
 
 
The strength of the realist theory lays in its ability to justify proliferation. In fact, it 
sees it as the only logical outcome for a state that has the technological capability to 
achieve it. The possession of this capability will also result in the state being taken 
seriously within the international environment of anarchy. This view has been 
criticised because it does not reflect what has actually happened. The number of 
states with nuclear weapons is still low and over the past 40 years only three states 
have acquired and maintained nuclear weapons. Many more have actually 
destroyed them or cancelled their nuclear weapon programmes. What the realist 
perspective does do, according to Hymans, is to correctly see the supply side as a 
central part of proliferation. However, at the same time it fails to explain a 
continued lack on the demand side.
19
  
 
Sagan argues that it is the absolute finality of the consequence of the use of nuclear 
weapons that has caused states to move them to a level above that of conventional 
military weapons. By doing so, they have effectively been removed, by most, from 
                                                          
17
 Hymans, Theories of nuclear proliferation the state of the field. Pg 24 in P Lavoy, Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation in the Next Decade (Routledge, 2007). 
18
 SD Sagan and KN Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd updated from 
1995 first edition ed. (W. W. Norton & Company, 2003). Pg 13. 
19
 Hymans, Theories of nuclear proliferation the state of the field. Pg 26 in Lavoy, Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation in the Next Decade. 
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the theoretical list of viable options available for state defence. This would explain 
the continued realist stance taken by most militaries with regards to conventional 
weapons. The nuclear option is thus rejected, Sagan suggests, on moral grounds, or 
on the belief that it lowers the state’s security by making it a target.
20
 It is widely 
agreed that realists consistently over predict future proliferation and find it difficult 
to explain the success of non-proliferation when it goes against their perception of 
what is in a state’s best interest.        
 
Neo-liberal Institutionalism 
 
This paradigm accepts much of the realist argument however it adds a further 
dimension to the debate. It does not take the utility of nuclear weapons possession 
as a given but rather argues that states undertake a complex cost benefit analysis as 
part of their decision making process. This analysis takes place on multiple levels; 
the international, domestic and the individual. Realists would regard this analysis as 
pointless because they see nuclear weapons as being the ultimate security 
guarantee for a state and their utility lies simply in the possessing of them.     
This distinction is critical because while both see interest as fixed they have different 
ideas about how those preferences can best be obtained and attach different 
weight to absolute as opposed to relative gains. 
  
The cost benefit calculations which are being carried out by states on all three levels 
acknowledge that they are interrelated and each can influence the other. The 
reactions of others, be they other states, domestic elements or individuals, matter 
and these can be considerations for all interest groups to varying degrees depending 
on the issue. This is because all groups want to pursue what is best for their 
perception of self interest but this itself is partly defined by what others groups are 
doing and how they define their self interest. Often this cost benefit calculation is 
                                                          
20
 Sagan “Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and Weapons of Mass Destruction” in SH Hashmi and 
S Lee, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction Religious and Secular Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
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focused on national economic factors, which is partially why economic sanctions are 
used as punishment for transgression within this fluid environment.  
 
This theory also offers a partial explanation of why both Japan and Germany have 
not proliferated even though they both have the capability. Both countries have 
derived economic advantage by not putting the money into nuclear weapons 
programmes. The result of this decision has been an increase in their respective 
status internationally in ways that would not have been possible had they chosen to 
proliferate.    
 
Summarising the two previous positions, from a realist perspective, the regime is at 
best a tool that potential proliferators can use in order to proliferate. For the neo-
liberal institutionalist the regime can affect the cost benefit calculations that states 
make about whether to proliferate or not and the stronger the regime is the more 
likely their decision will be not to proliferate. This is not because they are convinced 
that proliferation itself is a bad thing rather that in the current situation the cost of 
doing so outweighs the benefits. Before moving to the third paradigm, social 
constructivism, it is important to confirm that for these paradigms it is not a case of 
either or but a mixture of them all that provides the most comprehensive 
explanations for nuclear proliferation.      
 
Social Constructivism 
 
“The single most important factor in producing this success has been the non-
proliferation norm established by the NPT and the incentives for remaining non-
nuclear that the NPT helped initiate.”
21
  
 
The final paradigm comes from the social constructivist school. Constructivist view 
power as being more than just kinetic, that is the result of military dominance, and 
see it as being the result of process and not just structure. Maria Rublee has 
developed a framework that comes from this constructivist school and borrows 
                                                          
21
 G Bunn, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems," Arms Control Today 
33, no. 10 (2003). Pg 6. 
 14
from well-established social psychology theories to do so.
22
 Her framework is 
outlined in her book “Non-Proliferation Norms, Why States Choose Nuclear 
Restraint”. She uses her framework to explain why states have shown restraint in 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
23
 She tested her framework against states that 
have started to develop nuclear weapons and for a variety of reasons stopped these 
programmes. Her central argument is that the actions of these states, not to 
proliferate, cannot be sufficiently explained by the two previous theories that 
dominated IR. It is the inclusion of the constructivist paradigm that gives a more 
comprehensive explanation for what has occurred.  
 
To understand Rublee’s framework it is essential to understand how she has defined 
the international social environment and the non-proliferation regime that has 
evolved within it. The international social environment is the totality of competing 
and complementary regimes which covers a diversity of issues; security, human 
rights, international law and economics for example. It is essentially the fluid 
interplay of the domestic and the international. It can be looked at from a specific 
angle and for the purposes of this study, this angle is how it relates to the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. A regime establishes norms and norms shape regimes 
depending on how these norms are interpreted. I am focusing on the manner in 
which these norms are transmitted to and by states, and the subsequent 
acceptance or rejection of them by states. Regimes can often be in conflict with 
each other and the acceptance of one can require the rejection or a limited 
acceptance of others. State’s decisions can and do change depending on their 
domestic situation vis a vis the broader international social environment and the 
desire to place a greater emphasis on one regime over that of another. Rublee uses 
five countries as case studies to test her framework. Japan, Egypt, Libya, Sweden 
and Germany all of which started down the path of nuclear proliferation but for 
different reasons stopped. I will draw on these case studies as required. I will now 
                                                          
22
 In this study I use ‘constructivism’ interchangeably with ‘Rublee’s framework’. I acknowledge that 
constructivism is broader that Rublee’s framework however I am comparing it to realism and neo-
liberal institutionalism not other forms of constructivism.   
23
 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint. This book is the central text 
for my thesis.  
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explain how these norms are transmitted, processed and what defines their 
potency. 
 
Norm transmission is the different way in which the combined elements of the 
regime influence state decision makers. The first is by descriptive norms, which 
means two things, firstly that what states actually do is as important as what they 
say they will do. Secondly, states watch the actions of other states and base their 
actions in part on this. The result of this is that in complex situations appropriate 
state behaviour is defined by the collective actions of those that the state identifies 
with.
24
 Injunctive norms are prescriptive of proper or improper behaviour. The 
decision to choose one over the other will have consequences such as economic 
sanctions or the transfer of nuclear power technology.
25
 Subjective norms are the 
interpretation of descriptive and injunctive norms by decision makers as well as the 
absorption of related messages from the international community. They are the 
decision maker’s interpretation of what others believe about a norm.
26
  
 
There are numerous norms that states are subject to and the way in which these 
norms are accepted or rejected is the result of how they are processed.
 27
 There are 
three ways this happens; linking, activation and consistency.  
 
Linking is when an international norm is connected to well established pre-existing 
internal values. Being a responsible member of the international community is 
normally seen by states as being part of their internalised values. Non-proliferation 
is widely seen as a requirement of this therefore non-proliferation has been linked 
to what it is to be a responsible member of the international community. To 
proliferate is to break the connection with this specific value and to do so will have 
consequences.
28
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Activation is when a norm has been highlighted or made the focal point for decision 
making. Descriptive, injunctive and subjective norms can often contradict or 
compete with one another and it is the activation of one norm over another that 
can make a state decide in favour of it.
29
 
 
Consistency refers to past behaviour being the best predictor of future behaviour. 
Once a state makes a decision there is an internalisation of this decision which has a 
flow on effect. Proliferation which might have initially been a military decision by a 
small group of decision makers will then have an impact on diplomats, exporters, 
bankers as well as the wider population. 
30
 
 
The third element of the norm is its potency, which is how effective it is at 
influencing a state’s decision making. Potency is broken into three parts uncertainty, 
similarity and conflict. 
Uncertainty refers to, not knowing the impact, both positive and negative, that a 
specific decision made by a state will have on it, and how others see it. The greater 
the level of uncertainty that exists, the more likely the decision makers are to accept 
group or outside group influence in their decision making on the issue. In complex 
decisions like those concerning whether to proliferate or not, domestic 
considerations come into conflict with international norms and it is at these times, 
that outside assistance is often sought to assist in the decision making process.
31
  
 
Similarity refers to a norm being more potent if its transmitter is something or 
someone with whom the recipient can or wishes to identify with in the future.
32
   
 
And lastly conflict, which can have the effect of decreasing the potency of the norm 
that is being transmitted because of actual or expected conflict. This is because of 
the tendency to close ranks and look inwards during conflict.
33
 The conflict could be 
                                                          
29
 Ibid. Pg 45-46. 
30
 Ibid. Pg 46-49. 
31
 Ibid. Pg 49. 
32
 Ibid. Pg 49-50. 
33
 Ibid. Pg 50. 
 17
within a state, a civil war for example, but more often refers to one that comes from 
without. Iran pursuing nuclear weapons in 1985 during the Iran/Iraq war provide a 
clear example of this from my case study. This proliferation desire was reinforced 
after George Bush’s 2003 speech which labelled Iran as part of the “axis of evil”. The 
expectation of inevitable conflict between Iran and the US resulted in an increased 
emphasis being placed on proliferation by Iran’s elites.
34
 When states face an 
existential threat,  the result can be the subjugation of the norm in favour of 
proliferation. Israel can also be used to emphasise this point. Ongoing internal 
conflict with the Palestinians and more importantly existential threats from 
neighbouring Arab states have reaffirmed the initial desire to proliferate by its 
decision makers.   
 
The transmission, processing and potency of norms and each of their three sub 
parts allows one to understand the mechanics behind the adoption or rejection of 
non-proliferation norms. They allow analysis of the non-proliferation norms and 
how they operate within the international social environment. The final part of 
Rublee’s framework expands the state decision about whether to proliferate or not 
to proliferate and attempts to explain why that decision has been made. The why is 
critical because it enables assessment of the strength of the norm and it identifies 
the way in which the decision makers have accepted or rejected it. Rublee’s three 
outcomes or state rationale behind the acceptance or rejection of the norm are; 
persuasion, social conformity and identity.  
 
Persuasion describes the behaviour that results from a genuine transfer of 
preferences. “I now see that X is better than Y”.
35
It is the internalisation of a 
decision which is the result of a genuine change of preference.  
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Identification describes behaviour that is the result of the desire to follow, or the 
habit of following the actions of an important ally. This is the most flexible of the 
three as a decision to change can be the result of the change of preference of ally or 
a change of preference as to who that ally actually is. There does not need to be any 
internalisation of a state’s position in this case. However as discussed above norm 
processing and the role of consistency will result in the establishment of the 
necessary apparatus to support this decision. The length of time a state holds the 
same position, regardless of why, will play a large part in it maintaining that 
position. This is because the resulting institutionalisation and/or bureaucratisation 
of the policy can work against change through systemic inertia. 
  
Social conformity is behaviour that is the result of the desire to maximise social 
benefits and/or minimise social costs without changing underlying preferences. “I 
think that Y is better (or I like Y more) but since everyone else is doing X I will do X 
so as to not rock the boat”.
36
 Rublee emphasises the importance of differentiating 
between persuasion and social conformity because many states that don’t 
proliferate as a result of social conformity are in effect “nuclear hedging”.
37
 
Although they are not currently in possession of nuclear weapons some states have 
a plan to acquire them quickly if the international situation changes. South Korea 
and Sweden are examples of this. They have the technological capability, domestic 
nuclear expertise as well as the finances to internally develop nuclear weapons.
38
 
There is a fear that Iran will have the same option available to it if they acquire full 
cycle nuclear reprocessing capability as part of their nuclear power programme. 
Social conformity has clear linkages to neo-liberal institutionalist explanations for 
non-proliferation and the fluid nature of what is in the best interests of states.    
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The distinction between these three types of conformity can also be used to explain 
and define the different positions of interest groups within states. It is often the 
interplay of these interest groups as they each compete for their view to be the 
dominant one of the state that is crucial in determining a state’s nuclear policy. In 
the case of both Israel and Iran it is the exclusion of alternative points of view which 
is notable. All decisions regarding proliferation have always been held in the hands 
of an elite few. 
 
Attempts have been made to explain proliferation as being a consequence of a 
specific state’s sense of being outside of the international community or as Rublee 
phrases it “dissatisfied with the international status quo”.
39
 Because of this the 
transmission of normative non-proliferation messages are ineffectual because they 
are coming from an international community they reject or find hard to identify 
with. This is too simplistic as an explanation and comes from an A-historical 
perspective which does not explain change.  Seven years ago Libya could have been 
considered an example of this. However today it is the opposite. Israel is outside of 
the NPT and rejects non-proliferation norms (for its self) but is still an active 
member of the international community in other areas. The correlation between a 
sense or feeling of being outside of the status quo and proliferation may be related 
but are not directly causal.
40
  
 
Rublee’s framework is based on three interrelated non-proliferation outcomes that 
are the result of how individual state’s decisions have been influenced and shaped 
by international non-proliferation norms which have evolved from the regime. 
Rublee’s proposition is that it is the interplay of these three as well as the realist and 
neo-liberal institutionalist’s justifications that collectively best explain state non-
proliferation. According to Rublee the rationale behind a state’s acquiescence to the 
norm is just as important, if not more so than its actual acceptance. Understanding 
why states support the norm sheds light on the circumstances under which this 
support could be removed. It acknowledges the complexities of the situation both 
                                                          
39
 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint. Pg 51. 
40
 Ibid. Pg 50-51.  
 20
domestically and internationally but most importantly allows for and identifies the 
mechanisms for change. It is not a case of one or other it can be a combination of 
the three to varying degrees that result in the support of the norm. States could 
support the norm initially in order to conform but over time internalise the norm 
resulting in an acceptance through persuasion, so there has been transferral 
between the outcomes.   
 
Rublee proposes that her constructivist framework can be applied to other nuclear 
related questions as well as broader IR problematiques. The aim of my thesis is to 
see if her theory can assist in the explanation of state proliferation.  
 
Rublee emphasises that both realist and neoliberal institutionalism viewpoints are 
useful for partially explaining state non-proliferation. However, she proposes that 
her framework, although not perfect, adds a further layer to an explanation of why 
this has occurred. I will examine the different explanations for two states that are 
either in the process of proliferating (Iran) or have already proliferated (Israel). 
Before seeing if social constructivism is a useful tool in explaining non-conformity to 
regimes and norms. Both case studies offer different challenges to the non-
proliferation regime and its norms. They are also interconnected as each state uses 
the nuclear programmes of the other to justify its own nuclear programme in part.    
 21
Iran: The International Community’s Mixed Messages  
 
The long road to Bushehr 
 
This section will outline Iran’s nuclear programmes and discuss the various, often 
contradictory, ways in which it has been dealt with by the international community. 
I will see which paradigms help to identify where the non-proliferation regime has 
had difficulty in influencing Iran’s decision makers and the result this has had.   
 
Iran is the most populated country in the Middle East (over 70 million) and the 
second largest in size after Saudi Arabia. Geographically it is surrounded by seven 
countries as well as the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and the Caspian Sea. The Strait 
of Hormuz, where the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman meet is partially within its 
territorial waters. The Hormuz Strait is a strategically critical body of water that is 
the key access way for shipping especially for the movement of the world’s oil 
supplies. The US Energy Information Administration (US EIA) calls it “the most 
critical oil choke point on earth” and has calculated that roughly 35% of all seaborne 
traded oil or 20% of oil traded worldwide passes through this Strait.
41
Access through 
the strait, which requires passage through both Iranian and Omani territorial 
waters, has been negotiated via the UN Convention on the law of the Sea. 
 
Oil and Gas reserves are notoriously difficult to accurately calculate and it is often 
advantageous to miscalculate them for various reasons.
42
 This acknowledged, Iran is 
continually and consistently assessed as holding the world’s third largest oil reserves 
and the world’s second largest gas reserves.
43
 Iran produces over 90% of its 
domestic power capacity from oil, gas and coal fuelled power stations.
 44
 The 
government subsidises domestic oil and gas prices for its citizens because the 
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economy could not afford to function if it operated at, or even near, the 
international market prices.
45
 This huge reliance on oil and gas for domestic power 
generation and the subsidies on domestic use make sense because of Iran’s large 
reserves. However this domestic use is at the expense of potential export earnings 
in crucial foreign currency. Iran’s population is growing rapidly. Therefore unless 
change is made increasing domestic consumption will result in decreased quantities 
of oil and gas for export. Iran’s use and distribution of its natural resources is a 
domestic policy issue and these decisions are ultimately for the Iranians to decide 
for themselves. However the decision has become important because the domestic 
decision making process has led to the desire for Iran to develop a nuclear power 
programme. Iran is one of the original signatories of the NPT which clearly states 
that it is a right of every sovereign state to pursue such an option. This decision and 
its ramifications although very topical today is not new. Iran has been pursuing 
nuclear power technology with varying levels of success since the 1950s.         
 
The Iranians are Persians not Arabs and draw their cultural history from over 3000 
years of continuous civilisation. Iranians are almost exclusively followers of Shiite 
Islam and make up almost 40% of the total world’s followers.
46
 Shiites are 
approximately 15% of the world’s 1.5 billion followers of Islam making them a clear 
minority to the Sunni majority. Iranians see part of their national identity as relating 
back to their being descendants of the once great Persian Empire. This self 
perception runs contrary to how they are often portrayed by others, which is as an 
illegitimate, isolationist country with suspect motives.   
 
No exploration of Iran’s nuclear ambitions would be complete if it was not cross 
referenced to the most powerful event in Iran’s recent history, the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution. Prior to the revolution Iran was controlled by Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi who had become an autocratic ruler as a result of a CIA backed coup in 
1953. The CIA’s involvement is not disputed and this has been used as a rallying 
point for continued anti US sentiment ever since. The Coup saw the overthrow of 
                                                          
45
 S Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). Pg 26. 
46
 C.M. Blanchard, "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites" (2006). Pg1. 
 23
the democratically elected Prime Minister Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh who was 
subsequently, arrested, imprisoned and then died while under house arrest. The 
Shah was aligned to the west and implemented wide spread secular reforms. His 
reforms were known as the White Revolution and focused on breaking the existing 
power structures in Iran. Land reforms partially undertaken to diminish the strong 
localised authority of religious leaders were combined with a large investment in 
both health and education. The result of the reforms was a change to the internal 
power structures. Power moved from the land owners to the peasants and middle 
classes. However, the manner in which the changes were carried out created much 
resentment. This allowed religious leaders to gain support as they became the 
central and very vocal leaders of popular dissent. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was 
one such religious leader. His popularity grew as a result of his increased and very 
vocal opposition to the Shah’s rule. This culminated in his arrest and subsequent 
exile from Iran. Both Khomeini and Mossadegh were in agreement that the Shah 
should reign over but not have direct rule of Iran.   
 
Under the Shah Iran began the process of acquiring a nuclear research reactor. A 
deal was negotiated with the US which saw the sale and construction of a nuclear 
research facility which became operational in 1967. In 1975 Iran’s nuclear foot print 
was expanded when construction began on the Bushehr nuclear power reactor. The 
contract had gone to two German companies and it was expected to be finished by 
1981.  
 
The US had been a crucial part of the deal and although the construction of the 
reactor had gone to German companies, the US government was in full support of 
the deal. National Security Memorandum 292 dated 22 April 1975 and signed by 
Henry Kissinger in his capacity as the National Security Advisor (he was also the 
Secretary of State at the time) outlines US Iranian nuclear cooperation.
 47
 It details 
the US’s willingness to either; reprocess fusion material for Iran in the US or assist 
with the building of a multinational reprocessing centre in Iran. This is an important 
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piece of information because it is this full cycle reprocessing capability that has been 
the major sticking point in all of negotiations with Iran over its nuclear power 
generation today. Iran has consistently stated that it is its right under article IV of 
the NPT to have full cycle reprocessing. This capability would effectively mean that 
Iran would have a self sufficient nuclear power capability. The spent fuel from the 
reactor could be reprocessed and mixed with ore to produce more fuel for the 
reactor. Kissinger has since described his support as being based solely on economic 
considerations and that the idea that Iran would pursue nuclear weapons was not 
even then considered by the US.
48
At that time Dick Cheney was President Ford’s 
Chief of Staff and Donald Rumsfeld was his Secretary of Defence. Both of these men 
were part of the decision making and both of them had supported Iran’s nuclear 
programme. When part of the recent Bush administration it was clear they had both 
very vocally reversed their opinions on a nuclear Iran.  
 
All US nuclear assistance ceased because of the Islamic Revolution. The Shah was 
forced into exile and Khomeini returned from his exile and proclaimed himself, with 
mass popular support, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. All work 
stopped on the Bushehr reactor leaving it less than two years from completion. The 
Shah had started Iran’s nuclear power programme for economic reasons. The more 
domestic power that could be produced without using their fossil fuel resources the 
more would be available for Iran to export and earn foreign currency. If the 
revolution had occurred two years later the Bushehr reactor would have been 
operational. Instead it is still in its finishing stages today.   
 
The Iranian revolution was a surprise to the world especially the US who believed 
the Shah had effectively suppressed any internal opposition. This surprise turned to 
outrage when Iranian students took over the US embassy in Tehran. 52 of the 
embassy staff were held hostage for 444 days, a situation which has marred US-
Iranian relations ever since. This symbolic action was seen by many Iranians as 
reclaiming their national autonomy which had been compromised as a result of the 
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US backed coup in 1953. Saddam Hussein took advantage of both the domestic 
upheaval that resulted from the revolution and the growing international anti-
Iranian sentiment and invaded Iran. He was attempting to acquire disputed border 
territories rich in oil and of strategic military importance.
49
 Iraq, like Iran has a Shiite 
majority however Iraq was controlled by Saddam’s Sunni minority which was 
concerned that the Islamic Revolution could spread to Iraq.  
 
The Iran–Iraq War (known as the First Gulf War) lasted for eight years from 1980 
until 1988. Throughout the war most countries supported Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
Iraq was supplied, often through very large loans or oil contracts, with weapons, 
intelligence and technology. The total death toll for the Iranians was close to half a 
million people. The war ended after peace negotiations and the end result was 
almost no change to the pre-war borders. Both countries were left with huge debt, 
huge numbers of causalities and destroyed infrastructure. For Iran the war had the 
effect of bringing the country together in the common goal of defeating Iraq. This 
was strengthened as Khomeini not only lacked support from the outside world but 
also received no affective international condemnation for Iraq’s use of chemical 
weapons against Iranian troops. He used these two factors to unify the Iranian 
people and emphasise what he saw as the hypocrisy that existed as a result of US 
hegemony. This continues to resonate today throughout Iran with the US 
persistently being referred to as ‘The Great Satan’. The political system of Iran has 
effectively aligned in the minds of many of its population the Shah and his regime 
with the US, his primary supporter, in order to maintain negative US sentiment.  
 
After the revolution Khomeini initially showed no interest in finishing the Bushehr 
reactor project which he saw as being one of the Shah’s US inspired projects. In 
1985 during the war he changed his mind because of the potential to use the 
technology to develop nuclear weapons which could be used to end the war. US 
pressure against assistance and the poor security situation in Iran resulted in Iran 
being unable to find anyone to help finish the Bushehr reactor. Iraq also had a 
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partially constructed reactor in Osirak and in 1980 at the beginning of the war Iran 
superficially damaged this reactor in an air strike. Israeli, concerned at the prospects 
of a nuclear enabled Iraq successfully destroy it in 1981.
50
 The Iraqis subsequently 
bombed the Iranian Bushehr reactor in retaliation. It was after this and during a long 
stalemate in the war that Khomeini attempted to rebuild the reactor at Bushehr. 
The rationale for this decision was very different from when the Shah initially 
started the project. Iran was now at war and the potential utility of the nuclear 
reactor became its ability to facilitate the production of nuclear weapons. The 
deterrent effect that would have come from possession of nuclear weapons would 
have almost certainly guaranteed Iran’s victory over Iraq. The US pressure on other 
states not to assist the Iranians with their nuclear power ambitions came from their 
legitimate concern that Iran would do just this. It was from this point forward that 
Iran had to acquire nuclear equipment on a covert basis to avoid international 
sanctions. 
 
Full cycle nuclear reprocessing and the NPT 
 
“ARTICLE IV of the NPT 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all 
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II 
of this Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the 
Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together 
with other States or international organizations to the further development of the 
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of 
non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs 
of the developing areas of the world. 
51
“ 
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There are two conflicting interpretations of the above treaty article. Neither dispute 
the right of Iran to have nuclear power per se just whether it should be allowed the 
capability for full cycle reprocessing. Iran has been consistent in outwardly stating 
that it does not want nuclear weapons only nuclear power.
52
 The validity of this 
statement has been questioned by various states. The result of this has been that 
Iran’s attempts to acquire a nuclear capability have been dealt with inconsistently 
by the international community. 
    
Article IV is in no way specific on the right for full cycle reprocessing hence the 
opposing views leave a lot of room for argument. The major and most vocal 
opponents to Iran obtaining a full cycle reprocessing capability are the US and the 
EU. The EU’s negotiations are led by Great Britain, France and Germany with the 
focus being on dialogue and diplomacy. They are referred to as the EU-3. They 
operate as a consensus of three while still having the EU’s overall backing. This 
differs from the US’s approach, especially during the Bush administration, which is 
dominated by a carrot and stick approach. These different approaches stem from 
the alternative ways in which the two have reflected on the handling of Iraq. The 
EU-3 emphasized the need to keep the discussions open and to at least listen to 
Iran’s demands with respect. The Obama administration has worked more closely 
with the EU-3 and its approach. However, considerable differences in the 
approaches remain.  
 
China and Russia are two key state actors involved in the sale of nuclear power 
technology to Iran. They are both more pragmatic and focus on their economic 
relationship with Iran. This relationship gives them all access to foreign currency and 
petroleum supply security. Both are permanent members of the UNSC which means 
that their votes would be essential if the imposition of sanctions on Iran was ever 
put to a vote.  
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The different interpretations of the situation have led to different potential 
solutions. This has in turn resulted in Iran itself having to have a group of practical 
responses to meet the varied approaches that others are taking.
53
The result often 
appears to be contradictory from outside as Iran juggles the different demands that 
are placed on it by others.    
   
 The main EU-3 position is that if Iran’s intentions are only the development of 
nuclear power then why would it need a reprocessing capability, as it is a much 
more expensive option. Iran’s reply is due to our past experiences we cannot trust 
other states to guarantee supply of our nuclear fuel requirements. Holland, 
Germany, France all have the full cycle reprocessing capability, why are we being 
treated differently? This is an example of western hypocrisy.
54
  
 
The US position is more confrontational; due to past experience and Iran’s lack of 
disclosure of its capability it is better to be safe and deny access to the full cycle 
reprocessing option or at least retain control over it for Iran. Iran has not disclosed 
all of its nuclear facilities and some of them are being built underground to make 
detection difficult and to withstand aerial bombing. The US perspective is that if 
Iran’s intent was for the development of only nuclear power why did they do this as 
it is guaranteed under the NPT?  
 
Iran’s response has been that when we have the full cycle reprocessing capability it 
will be under IAEA inspection as the NPT stipulates which will ensure that it 
operates in a transparent manner.   
Because the US has denied Iran (including the placing of pressure on other states) 
that which it was legally entitled to under the NPT we had no choice but to pursue 
covert procurement from sources like the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan. In the 
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design of our nuclear facilities separation is prudent planning and done by all 
nuclear powers to spread risk. Israel, a non NPT signatory state, conducted an aerial 
campaign against Iraq in 1981 we are wary that they may attempt similar military 
action against us.  
    
The more aggressive US position has been that Iran has lots of oil and gas for the 
generation of power why does it need nuclear power.
55
 The overall US position is 
that it cannot trust Iran not to develop nuclear weapons and if it has a full cycle 
reprocessing capability it would make it easier for Iran to do so. The Iranian reply is 
that Iran, Tehran especially, is hugely polluted and it needs cleaner power 
generation. Also the oil and gas we use for power generation is depriving us of 
foreign currency we need for domestic investment. The Iranian response to the US’s 
inability to trust their real motives is usually redirected towards accusations of 
hypocrisy and imperialism. The NPT is not clear on this area which gives all actors a 
lot of space in which to argue the issue.  
Iran’s regional situation 
 
Iran is philosophically opposed to the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam. In 
Afghanistan’s civil war Iran supported the Northern Alliance both financially and 
materially against the Taliban. Iran’s neighbouring enemies, Iraq and the Taliban of 
Afghanistan, have both been ‘defeated’ militarily by Iran’s strategic enemy the US.
56
 
This placed Iran’s rulers in a very difficult position. Traditionally the enemy of your 
enemy is your friend. In this case this is clearly not the case.    
 
Iran’s elites have been transparent in their desire to play a wider leadership role 
within the Middle East, which makes many of these state’s elites nervous. Many of 
the other states in the region are secular and see the Islamic republic as a threat. 
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Egypt and Saudi Arabia see themselves as potentially filling this wider leadership 
role so are also concerned. The impact of Iranian regional dominance is seen by 
Israel as being potentially disastrous. President Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric aside, Iran 
does not formally acknowledge the existence of Israel and actively funds Hamas and 
Hezbollah to resist any extension of Israeli territory as well as undermining its claim 
to legitimacy. Israel’s close ties with the US and Iran’s hostility towards both states 
has resulted in Iran seeing both states as the same threat just from different 
geographical locations. In essence Israel and the US are a supranational threat to 
Iran.
57
 
 
During the 1990s, Iran’s relationship with most of the outside world improved. The 
Second and Third Gulf Wars represented a different US and international reaction to 
Iraq. This concurrently improved Iran’s security situation, by defeating Iraq on the 
battle field, and lessened it, because of the concentration of US led forces on its 
border. The lack of assistance during The Gulf War had shown that Iran did not have 
any neighbouring allies. Within the wider region those that did assist did so through 
covert means with the sale of weapons usually for oil. It is clear, and Iran’s foreign 
policy has always reflected this, that no effective security guarantee from other 
states exists.  
 
It does have relationships with some states, however, these relationships tend to be 
based on economic utility, especially the supply of oil and gas. In return Iran has 
been able to import limited consumer goods, military hardware and technology 
primarily from Russia (USSR), China, India, Pakistan and especially DPRK. This has 
sometimes been overtly stopped under pressure from the US and some European 
states and other times this has occurred more indirectly.  
 
The US’s recent bilateral agreement with India (one of the three non signatory 
states of the NPT) facilitates the sharing of nuclear power technology. This has been 
driven by the US’s desire to lower India’s dependency on Iranian oil and gas 
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imports.
58
 The US’s bilateral actions, like this deal with India, have diminished the 
power of the non-proliferation regime in the eyes of the Iranians. Iran perceives the 
application of US double standards as occurring without any effective condemnation 
from the international community. India, as a non signatory of the NPT, should not 
be eligible for nuclear technology from a NPT signatory, in this case the US. The US is 
seen as effectively placing a higher importance on strategic goals than it has on 
upholding its NPT obligations. India has refused to sign the NPT for ideological 
reasons which stem from the selective cut off date for the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons (once the dominant powers had got them), and an attempt to restrict 
technology transfer to developing countries.  
 
The Group of Nuclear Suppliers (GNS) was established to limit the sale of nuclear 
technology to non NPT countries and to ensure that the IAEA was aware of any such 
sales. This is to enable the IAEA to verify that what states say and do is the same 
thing. In a contradictory response the GNS opposed the US arrangement with India 
while the Director General of the IAEA supported it. He did so because he saw it as a 
way of verifying some of the capability of a non signatory state and as a step 
forward to bringing India in line with the non-proliferation regime. Again Iran sees 
this as hypocrisy in action.  
 
Iran has a comprehensive educational system and as a consequence of its 
international isolation has had to be self sufficient in a diverse range of areas. This 
includes scientific personnel with training in nuclear technology. Much of this 
training has come from overseas, some from Russia, China and there is evidence 
that Iranian scientists were present at the DPRK’s long range missile launch in 
2006.
59
 The complexity of nuclear missile technology means that firsthand 
experience of its operation would be essential if it were to be replicated by a 
country with Iran’s level of resources. Nuclear technology costs a lot of money and 
no country would give it away for free. Iran’s energy resources are an ideal 
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bargaining chip and even Pakistan through the A.Q. Khan network has been willing 
to risk US disapproval to gain access to this resource.
60
 
 
The proliferation decision making of the elites 
 
Iran has a unique power structure in which supreme control is held by a non-
popularly elected Ayatollah. The head Ayatollah (known as the Supreme leader) is 
selected by a small council of guardians who also have final say over all candidates 
for the wider “democratic” elections. After Khomeini’s death in 1989 Ayatollah 
Khamenei replaced him and he is still in power today. It is the Supreme Leader and 
the council of guardians that hold the real power and the elected president and 
parliament operate within a limited sphere. All foreign policy decisions have to be 
approved at the highest level. The council controls the Revolutionary Guards (as the 
name suggests they are the guardians of the ideals of the revolution) who in turn 
controls all nuclear capability. The reality is that despite President Ahmadinejad’s 
rhetoric, although influential, he does not have control over Iran’s nuclear 
programmes.  
 
Almost no public debate occurs around nuclear proliferation in Iran which is the 
same as in Israel. Any potential UNSC economic sanctions against Iran because of its 
nuclear programme would have a negative effect on the lives of average Iranians. 
The issue for Iran is the balance between being nuclear self reliant and the prestige 
that this is perceived to bring, and the economic consequences of doing so outside 
of the non-proliferation regime. Iranians have been closely watching the DPRK’s 
decision to proliferate and the continued suffering of the citizens that has been a 
consequence of this. To disregard the international regime can possibly bring an 
increased feeling of autonomy and international respect (or fear) but this would 
come at a huge economic and social cost. Although much public debate is removed 
from the actual decision making process events like President Bush’s 2003 speech in 
which he named Iran as part of the ‘Axis of evil’ has had the effect of bringing 
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popular support behind Iran nuclear power programme and reemphasised the need 
for self reliance.
61
  The invasion of Iraq has affected how Iran perceives security and 
is partially responsible for the election of the ultra conservative President 
Ahmadinejad. His support has decreased over time and the 2009 Presidential 
election, of which the results were disputed, resulted in massive populist protest 
marches.    
 
Iran is still a member of the NPT. It has not seriously threatened to leave the NPT as 
DPRK did in the early 1990’s, eventually leaving in 2003. The regime is seen as 
having clear utility for them as a country especially given its troubled relationships 
with its neighbours and other regional states. A highly nuclearised Middle East 
would be as negative for it as it is in the minds of much of the world’s elites. Iran has 
been and continues to be very vocal over what it perceives as the double standards 
that exist in the treatment of different states. Using Rublee’s terminology for the 
transmission of the non-proliferation norms, Iran focuses on the descriptive norms 
of other states, that is, state’s actions not their rhetoric.
62
 Iran uses this 
interpretation rather than proscriptive or injunctive norms to shape its 
interpretation of subjective norms. By emphasising the actions of other actors it is 
able to move the spotlight away from itself.  
 
 The constant presence of perceived conflict through potential external threats 
limits the potency of the non-proliferation norm. The existence of this conflict and 
the many different approaches that states and institutions have used with Iran has 
allowed it to play one of them off against the other to Iran’s advantage. The 
consequence of this has been a muddying of the waters and the inability of the 
parts of the regime to work together to ensure that Iran complies with its 
international obligations under the NPT. The often contradictory approaches from 
members of the international community have greatly affected how the Iranian 
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decision makers have processed non-proliferation norms in favour of what they 
want rather than what they are entitled to under the regime.
63
   
   
Iran has been to war with its neighbour Iraq and this neighbour has in turn been 
invaded by Iran’s long term adversary the US. This has led to a fear that the same 
could also happen to Iran. Being labelled as part of the “axis of evil” had the effect 
of compounding this. Although no immediate threat exists, Iran’s position is such 
that it cannot rule out one emerging from its neighbours or as the Gulf Wars have 
shown from the US and its allies. Based on past experience Iran has no state or 
collection of states from which it can realistically expect effective overt support. This 
is especially true if the threat came from the US. The US has operational combat 
troops in two of Iran’s neighbouring states (Iraq and Afghanistan) as well as an 
extensive presence in Turkey. The US also has access to airfields and ports in 
Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan as well as numerous military installations across 
the Persian Gulf. Iran is effectively surrounded and although military action against 
it has not occurred, the possibility of it happening in the future is likely to shape the 
elites decision making. US actions such as the Bush administration’s 2004 sale to 
Israel of 500 bunker-busting smart bombs, which are capable of penetrating thick 
concrete like that found in nuclear installations, only adds to its insecurity.
64
  
 
Because Iran already sees itself as a target, some commentators believe that the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons would not increase but effectively decrease the 
current threat situation.
65
 Iran has closely watched the DPRK leaving the NPT and 
then conducting nuclear tests. This case has exposed the limitation of any effective 
intervention against its proliferation and emphasised the toothlessness of the non-
proliferation regime in this instance.
66
 Iraq and Afghanistan have collectively 
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exhausted the appetite of many developed countries for large scale military 
intervention. The diplomatic approach, which has been more favoured by the 
Europeans, has become more popular, if not more effective. The non-proliferation 
regime has lost some of its perceived influence through its inconsistent application. 
The US’s bilateral arrangement with India, the continued silence on Israel’s nuclear 
capability and the willingness to forgive Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation in favour of 
its material support for the war in Afghanistan have all added to this.
67
 Iran sees 
itself as a potential target with or without nuclear weapons. This has been used by 
some of its elites to justify their covert development. 
 
Iran continually proclaims that it is only interested in a nuclear power capability 
while continuing to do everything possible to make it impossible to confirm the 
validly of this, as well as behaving in such a manner as to raise legitimate doubts 
about this intent. Realists have argued that if a state wants nuclear weapons the 
rational self help thing to do is to use NPT membership to develop nuclear power. 
Then it should leave the NPT and develop nuclear weapons utilising the technical 
knowhow it has gained. This is similar to what the DPRK has done. Concern that Iran 
will do the same underlies most of the objections to it having a full cycle 
reprocessing capability.   
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Israel: Special Friendships to Maintain a Nuclear Monopoly 
 
The short road to Dimona 
  
Israel my second case study, like Iran it provides a complex challenge for attempting 
to explain why states chose and continue to choose nuclear proliferation in 
opposition to the dominant non-proliferation norms. Starting with an overview of 
Israel’s security environment, its domestic nuclear policies and then an account of 
how it has acquired nuclear weapons. Finally, concluding with an analysis of why I 
think Israel has an undeclared nuclear weapon capability in opposition to a powerful 
non-proliferation norm.  
    
I have chosen Israel as one of my case studies because it is not a signatory of the 
NPT and therefore is to an extent outside the direct impact of the international non-
proliferation regime. Because of this Israel’s case poses an interesting challenge of 
how a norm affects those that are not legally bound by it. Israel has had nuclear 
weapons since the late 1960s and has continued to further develop this capability 
since then. During this time the international non-proliferation regime has 
developed into an influential tool to shape state behaviour. Partially because of 
Israel’s special relationship with the US Israel’s behaviour has not been condemned 
by any state or group of states in any effective way. Israel’s complex security 
situation has resulted in it defining security almost exclusively in militarily terms. 
The manner in which the modern state of Israel was created and the rationale and 
historical context behind this establishment are other key parts. It is the interplay of 
these elements that I will examine in attempt to explain not just why it started a 
nuclear programme but more importantly why Israel maintains one in the highly 
secretive manner in which it does outside of the international regime.  
 
Israel is small country on the eastern end of the Mediterranean sea. Within its 
current borders exist some of the longest continually inhabited areas of the world. 
The birth of the state of Israel was a difficult and very controversial process. The 
Zionist movement, which was established in Europe in the 19
th
 century, was the 
 37
international political movement behind the lobbying of sympathetic governments 
and institutions for a return to the Jewish homeland. The movement drew on 
religious sources like the Torah, for its references to the right of the Jewish people 
to return to their ancestral homeland. The movement saw this as giving them the 
right to claim territory that was occupied by Palestinians. The growth of support for 
the movement occurred within a larger context of growing European anti-Semitism 
which culminated in the holocaust.   
The Jewish right of return is still an important point today which shapes the Israeli 
perspective. Israeli’s are not occupiers, vanquishers or imposters but rather the 
rightful inhabitants returning to their rightful territory as promised to them by God. 
Regardless of how many believe this to be literally true it has been woven into the 
identity of Israel effectively enough to no longer be able to be debated or separated 
from it. The sense of rightful entitlement to return was reinforced by the horrors of 
Nazi Germany’s actions against the Jewish people. These gave rise to a powerful 
determination to support the establishment of a Jewish state.   
 
Palestine was under British mandate after World War I and it was during that time 
that a stream of Jewish settlers moved to Palestine and bought land. In 1948, 
legitimised by a UN mandate, David Ben-Gurion declared the creation of the state of 
Israel and became its first Prime Minister.
68
 This had followed a period of conflict 
between the Jewish settlers and both the British and the Palestinians. The 
establishment of the Jewish state has remained controversial since its inception. The 
original state of Israel was a sub part of Palestine and the intent was for the two 
states to exist side by side. 
 
 The Arab states that surround it have all collectively and individually been involved 
in conflict with Israel. Israel has won every one of those conflicts and at different 
times has occupied parts of those state’s territories. A strong conventionally armed 
military with near universal conscription has existed in Israel from its inception. 
Because Israel is so small geographically it has adopted the doctrine of pre-emptive 
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strikes taking the battle out of its borders as quickly as possible. After Israel 
developed nuclear weapons they were incorporated into its doctrine as an option of 
‘last resort’. This is because the countries it has been to war with, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and Syria, are all on its borders. So the deployment of a 
nuclear weapon would potentially be self destructive. The four conditions required 
for the deployment of nuclear weapons are; firstly a successful Arab penetration 
into populated areas within Israel’s post 1949 (since been changed to post 1967) 
borders, secondly the destruction of the Israeli air force, thirdly the exposure of 
Israeli cities to massive and devastating air attacks or to possible chemical or 
biological attacks, and lastly the use of nuclear weapons against Israeli territory.
69
   
 
Israel has never used its nuclear weapons because its defence force has decisively 
won every military engagement it has been involved in. After every war elements of 
the international community have been part of the subsequent peace negotiations. 
What has evolved from this is what many refer to as a “cold peace” in the region. 
Many of the grievances that led to the wars still exist but the overwhelming military 
strength of Israel, which has been proven on the battlefield, has made the 
diplomatic option the only feasible course of action for its neighbours.  
 
Israel maintains one of the worlds’ most highly trained and equipped defence forces 
through conscription and foreign armament purchases. It is essentially always on 
the alert and permanently militarised to meet any future threat. In Israel the extent 
of this military commitment can be seen in the very large proportion of its GDP that 
is spent on the military. Over the last decade this has averaged 8 % (this does not 
include military aid from the US).
70
 It peaked at 25% in the early eighties.  
 
The Palestinians have had very little say in their situation and are constantly used as 
pawns in Israel’s discussions on security. Rockets and suicide bombers that originate 
from Palestine are used as justification for offensive military campaigns into the 
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Palestinian territories in the name of security. The Israeli situation leads to emotive 
polarisation of viewpoints and reflects highly subjective and often normative 
assessments. What is clear is that Israel has faced existential threats throughout its 
history and every time a threat has occurred it has met the threat with conventional 
forces and won.
71
 The deterrent effect of their undeclared nuclear capability is 
impossible to precisely determine, but it is reasonable to assume that it has been 
and remains a factor in the decision making process of the elites of past and 
potential adversaries.   It is this monopoly on the nuclear deterrent within the 
Middle East that Israel is so focused on maintaining.    
 
Foreign support and special relationships 
 
In looking at Israel and its nuclear programme my focus is on two areas. Firstly, the 
actions of the Israeli elites and how they enforced almost total secrecy around the 
nuclear programme ensuring that it has never been publicly debated. Secondly the 
inconsistent manner in which the international community, the US especially, has 
reacted to and continues to react to Israel’s nuclear programme.  To better 
understand these two factors it is important to also explain the powerful linkages to 
both the Jewish holocaust of World War II and the manner in which the Jewish state 
was established as an ethnic democracy.
72
   
 
Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, travelled to the concentration camps 
at the conclusion of World War II to witness firsthand the extent of the holocaust.
73
 
It was this experience that reinforced his view of firstly, the need for a Jewish 
homeland in which all Jews would be safe. And, secondly, that the Jewish people 
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could not rely on gentiles to protect them, therefore the Jewish homeland must be 
defended by Jews. The extreme nature of Nazi treatment of the Jews was the final 
straw in what had been centuries of varying degrees and forms of persecution that 
the Jewish minorities faced throughout much of the world. Cohen goes as far as to 
say that it was the holocaust that provided Israel (through Ben-Gurion) with the 
“justification and motivation for the (nuclear) project”.
74
  
 
The Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona (in the Negev desert in southern Israel) was 
built with French technological assistance. The French were assisting in part because 
of a sense of solidarity in their opposition against the Arabs. The French regularly 
had to suppress separatist’s rebellions in Algeria which they believed were being 
funded by Nasser in Egypt. The French thought that a strong Israel would distract 
Nasser and force him to keep his attention on his immediate neighbours.
75
   
 
Israel’s nuclear programme started in 1957. As a consequence of pressure from 
various states Israel had to regularly source separate pieces of equipment from 
different countries to blur the line between nuclear power research and nuclear 
weapon development.
76
 The Six Day War of 1967 between Israel, Jordan, Syria and 
Egypt signified a change in Israel nuclear policy. If Israel did not have operational 
nuclear weapons prior to the war, it was the trigger for it to assemble one.
77
 Israel 
has never overtly tested a nuclear weapon which has assisted them maintain what is 
now referred to as a policy of opacity.
78
 Originally this policy was described as one 
of ambiguity by the Israeli elites however this was forced to change as a result of the 
NPT. Israel was finding it more difficult to no longer declare where it stood with 
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regards to its nuclear capability. The result was that Israel moved to an official policy 
of opacity and reached a compromise with the US over its non disclosure status.
79
  
 
As was the case with Iran, Henry Kissinger was the person advising the US president 
on what to do. This resulted in 1970 with Israel promising the US that it would not 
be the “first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East”.
80
 The 
agreed definition of what introduced meant was the testing of or deployment of 
nuclear weapons. Israel saw the benefit of maintaining this promise because it acted 
as a form of insurance. It insured that the US would continue to supply Israel with its 
conventional weapon requirements ensuring a military technological advantage 
over its adversaries. The Israeli nuclear doctrine outlined in the previous section 
meant that they were only a weapon of last resort, so if Israel had to break the 
promise with the US, it would be as a consequence of near or total military defeat.  
This special relationship with the US remains today and Israel is the recipient of an 
estimated three billion dollars’ worth of what is termed ‘military aid’ annually.
81
 This 
‘aid’ is a key part of the special military technology transfer relationship that they 
share, but is limited to the transfer of conventional weapons. Although they are 
conventional weapons they are highly advanced weapons such as missile and missile 
defence systems and fixed and rotary attack aircraft, which ensures Israel’s military 
dominance.  
 
 The consequence of this policy is that Israel neither confirms nor denies its weapon 
capability both internationally in the diplomatic arena, and also internally in any 
form of domestic political debate. The combined consequence of Israel’s policy of 
opacity and the fact it is not a member of the NPT means Israel is the only state that 
has made itself exempt from any form of scrutiny of its nuclear position both 
domestically and internationally. This has been allowed to happen largely because 
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of US backing. As Israel was being established a small group of elites led by Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion decided that Israel would have nuclear weapons to ensure that 
the holocaust would never happen again. This decision has since been continuously 
supported by subsequent elites.
82
 When Rublee writes about how states process 
norms she uses the word consistency. In this context she means past behaviour as 
being the best predictor of future behaviour. Israel made its decision to pursue the 
nuclear option before the establishment of an effective non-proliferation norm. This 
decision had had twenty years to be internalised by the elites. It was internalised, 
even bureaucratised by those at the very top who had knowledge of the secret 
nuclear programme. The fact that Israel has not faced any serious repercussions for 
this policy has led many of the Israeli elites to regard this as proof of its success and 
plays a role in the strong opposition to changing it.   
 
Opacity and the elites 
 
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the first and longest serving Prime Minister of Israel was 
the key person in establishing Israel’s nuclear weapon programme. Cohen describes 
how it was the decisions that he made at the crucial period of the establishment of 
the state of Israel when he, and a small number of his elites, had almost complete 
control over all key decision making. At the time that was considered necessary 
because of the huge challenges that the emerging Jewish state faced on many 
fronts. It had no industrial base which meant very limited economic activity. It had 
had to fight for the initial establishment and continued possession of its territory so 
its long term security was far from certain. It had a constant influx of Jewish 
immigrants returning to the homeland who needed to be employed, and the 
necessary social infrastructure had to be established to support them. The 
establishment of the collectivised Kibbutz were part of the initial solution to some of 
these challenges and were seen as an important building block in the building of the 
state.  
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Cohen argues that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was the only leader who has ever had 
the capability through his near absolute moral and bureaucratic authority to 
instigate the secret nuclear development.
 83
 The timing was critical because in the 
mid to late 1950’s no effective international non-proliferation norm existed to 
counter Ben-Gurion’s nuclear aspirations.  
 
It was Israel’s special relationship with France that allowed this desire to become a 
reality. France facilitated the transfer of the necessary technology to build the 
Dimona reactor and fuel reprocessing capability without any effective safe guards 
against future nuclear weapon production. Without this assistance Cohen 
speculates that by the time Israel could have developed the same capability 
internally the domestic political situation would have been vastly different. 
International norms would have had to be seriously considered and the more open 
democratic processes would have made the secrecy, surrounding the nuclear 
programme, much harder if not impossible to replicate. The decision by Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion and the assistance by the French had opened the door and 
firmly established the path to nuclear weapon production. Future governments 
were compelled to keep this a secret. This was partially reinforced by the 
establishment of non-proliferation norm because to make it public would not only 
mean that Israel had to confess to going behind the back of the international 
community but also expose the complicity of other states that had assisted it. 
Norway sold it the heavy water it required for its reactor and British bureaucrats, 
through a Norwegian company and without official government approval, sold it 
some of the necessary dual purpose technology for its nuclear programme.
84
  
 
Cohen’s in-depth research and informed observations in his book “Israel and the 
Bomb” is considered the seminal work on how and why Israel acquired its nuclear 
capabilities. It is limited in that it is a historical analysis and although it draws from a 
variety of sources and is highly regarded, it does not effectively address the 
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question of why Israel continues to reject the near universal non-proliferation norm. 
His conclusion is that the current policy of opacity is outdated and no longer 
supports Israel’s best interests.  His book finishes at the end of the 1960s with Israel 
acquiring nuclear weapons.  
 
Rublee’s book uses case studies of states that have either acquired nuclear weapons 
or the capability to develop them and then consciously decided against continuing 
down that path. Her premise is that it was the way in which the states reacted to or 
embraced the international non-proliferation norm that resulted in this change of 
national policy. What makes Israel different? Why has the subsequent strengthening 
and enforcement of this international norm not changed what is still today a policy 
of nuclear opacity?  
 
A big part of the answer to this comes from how Israel has been allowed to maintain 
its policy of opacity when it is not supported by the facts. Mordechai Vanunu, who 
was a technician at the Dimona nuclear facility, is the most well known example of a 
person who has exposed Israel’s nuclear weapon capability. He did so in 1986 by 
providing detailed information, including photos taken from within Dimona showing 
parts of nuclear weapons. He provided this information to a journalist from a British 
newspaper, the Sunday Times. After the publication of this information he was 
caught in a Mossad honey trap. He went with the agent to Rome from where he was 
abducted to Israel. In Israel he was tried and convicted in secret for treason and 
espionage and sentenced to 18 years imprisonment most of which was served in 
solitary confinement.
85
 This is an example of the sort of lengths that the Israeli 
government has gone to, to protect its stance of nuclear opacity. By maintaining the 
policy of opacity the government has effectively side stepped any application of the 
non-proliferation norm to itself. Israel’s unique security situation, being surrounded 
by past adversaries, and the perceived benefit from holding a nuclear monopoly in 
the Middle East by way of its policy of opacity is seen as acceptable to it and the US.       
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Israel is the only democracy in the world that has a military censor who operates on 
a permanent basis.
86
 As a consequence of there being no formal acknowledgement 
of Israel’s nuclear capability there is no open public debate on the issue. Similar 
debates occur, at least to some degree, in all other states with some nuclear 
capability, and all of those that are democracies. The most prominent academic who 
has focused on Israel’s nuclear history is US based Avern Cohen. Over the last 20 
years he has written many books and articles on the subject however he no longer 
travels to Israel for fear of interrogation and/or arrest.  
 
Israel is an ethnic democracy. A liberal democracy embraces diversity and 
multiculturalism to produce a collective identity. An ethic democracy although 
incorporating some diversity has one dominant ethnic group. In the case of Israel it 
is the Jewish ethnicity, which is the central basis for domestic and international 
policy decisions.
87
 Sammy Smooha, an academic who has extensively researched 
ethnic democracies describes it as follows: 
“Israel is a diminished ethnic democracy and not a liberal democracy because the 
state recognizes ethnic groups, and not just individuals. It is neither a liberal nor a 
multicultural democracy because it makes the Jews a core ethnic nation and the 
Arabs non-core outsiders.”
88
 
 
Smooha suggests that the model of ethnic democracy is particularly valid for 
democratising states that attempt to manage their divided societies without giving 
up structured majority dominance.
89
 The dominant Jewish Israeli perception is that 
Israel is a western liberal democracy, and that Israel can be democratic and Jewish 
at the same time. This view has been accepted by Western liberal democracies even 
though it is not correct. The initial UN mandate of 1947 allowed for the formation of 
two states one Jewish and the other Arab. This action has internationally legitimised 
the merging of democracy and Jewish dominance which has resulted in Israel being 
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an ethnic democracy. In other words, there is international legitimacy for the 
existence of an ethnic democracy in Israel.
90
 
 
Israel has never signed the NPT therefore it is not breaking any existing international 
law or enforceable obligation as a result of its ownership of nuclear weapons. What 
it is doing is standing outside of a very powerful international regime, one which has 
near total state membership and by any measure has been a resounding success in 
limiting nuclear proliferation. 
91
 Although Israel is not a signatory to the NPT, and as 
a result not subject to the independent inspections by the IAEA that signatory states 
are, it remains an out spoken critic of other states who attempt to acquire nuclear 
capability.  
 
Israel’s criticism has been directed at states that are signatories of the NPT, and thus 
states that are subject to IAEA inspections as well as UNSC sanctions for treaty 
violations. These states (at least the elites of the states at the time of signing the 
NPT) have voluntarily made their states accountable to both international law and 
the reinforcement of the dominant non-proliferation norms.  This means that Israel, 
itself not bound by established non-proliferation international law (and its 
associated sanctions), is using the NPT and its associated broader non-proliferation 
norms as a foreign policy tool to justify criticism of selective states that it perceives 
as threatening its security. This has occurred while Israel is not legally accountable 
for its actions under international law and hence removed from the enshrined 
checks and balances that signatories face.  
Iraq and Iran are both examples of countries about which Israel has been very 
outspoken in relation to their acquisition of any nuclear capability. In the case of 
Iraq this went beyond just talk, to the unilateral aerial bombing of its nuclear 
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facilities in 1981. Israel continues to make overt threats to carry out the same 
actions against Iran today.
92
 
   
Israel has not as yet done the same to Iran because the Iranian installations are 
more geographically dispersed with some close to population centres. Also the 
bombing of the Iraqi facilities actually encouraged Iraq to seek nuclear weapons it 
just made them more careful to hide their nuclear programmes in the future.
93
  
 
This raises the question of what impact Israel’s stance has on the international non-
proliferation norm? Does it strengthen or weaken the norms standing in the eyes of 
other states? Has the non-proliferation norm failed in the case of Israeli, or is it as 
much of the literature suggests, a case of “Israeli exceptionalism”. That is, that the 
specific security circumstances and the continuously repeated existential threats 
made against Israel, placed into the historical context of the holocaust, mean that a 
separate standard is justified, or at least acceptable to the dominant world powers.  
If this is the case then it must be a case of the Israeli identity being the dominant 
factor in its decision to proliferate. This must have overridden the influence of social 
conformity because the perceived existential threat environment will always result 
in the security benefits side of proliferation dominating any discussion regardless of 
the cost. Put simply, survival at any cost is more highly valued than the international 
consequences of attaining and maintaining what is believed to be a guarantee of 
that survival. Alternatively the protection of international institutions is acceptable 
for other states but not necessary for Israel.        
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Iran and Israel Non-Conformity to Norms 
 
In her conclusion Rublee states her central argument and the conclusions she has 
reached as follows; 
“This book has argued that the international social environment, supported by first 
an emergent and then a full-fledged nuclear non-proliferation regime, has helped to 
provide that systemic impetus towards nuclear non-proliferation.” 
94
 
She continues; 
“First, not all nuclear forbearance is alike. Some states may be persuaded, others 
may be constrained by social conformity, and still others may identify with important 
allies. Second, it is important to identify and understand the mechanisms through 
which the social environment exerts influence.”
95
  
In reviewing her book Nina Tannenwald, who has written extensively on the nuclear 
taboo, asks if Rublee’s framework could be tested in a more robust manner if one 
looks at the international normative environment and its effects on state’s 
behaviour when the outcome is proliferation.
 96
  
“...since the conceptual framework she (Rublee) lays out in principle ought to be able 
to explain decisions for proliferation as well as forbearance.”
97
  
Referring to state nuclear proliferation, Tannenwald asks,  
“Did the norms fail, did constructivism fail or did both succeed but in undesirable and 
unanticipated ways?”
98
  
So far I have detailed three approaches to looking at state nuclear proliferation and 
then applied them to Iran and Israel. I will now look at the constructivist approach in 
more detail and also explore some of the external, (from the regime) influences that 
have shaped these two state’s desire to proliferate.   
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I begin by looking at persuasion, identity and social conformity in relation to my two 
case studies. It is obvious that neither of my case studies can be put into one of 
these three groups, as Rublee’s can, because they have not effectively accepted the 
non-proliferation norm. However by working through her concepts of transmission, 
processing and potency it is possible to see if and why they fit or fail to fit. This 
process assists in identifying whether there are actual shortcomings in the non-
proliferation norm, or the regime, or whether it is something external that allows 
this to happen. 
 
Israel has clearly not been persuaded that following the non-proliferation norm is in 
its best interests. It has been reported that the words “never again” (referring to the 
holocaust) are welded in Hebrew and English on to the first Israeli nuclear 
weapon.
99
 From Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s initial decision to pursue nuclear 
weapons there has never been any change in policy. Control of the nuclear 
programme has been passed to subsequent ruling elites regardless of what side of 
the political spectrum they come from. The lack of popular debate on the topic and 
the resulting policy of opacity has entrenched the decision makers’ belief that 
proliferation and the nuclear option as a last resort is a necessary part of Israeli 
defence. The consequence of changing this policy would be seen as detrimental to 
Israeli’s security. 
 
For Israel, supporting the enforcement of the regime on to other states is a way of 
strengthening its security by ensuring that it maintains a nuclear monopoly in the 
Middle East. Israel wants a high degree of openness and transparency applied to 
other state’s nuclear programmes, especially those that it sees as potential threats, 
but resists any attempt to have the same standards imposed on itself.    
  
 Iran on the other hand is outwardly trying to convince the international community 
that it is not interested in nuclear weapon proliferation. It presents itself as having 
been persuaded to embrace the non-proliferation norm and that it is only wants 
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nuclear power.  A 2005 fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khamenei which banned nuclear 
weapons in Iran has regularly been used to reinforce this view.
100
 It is the 
international community that does not believe this to be the case because the 
evidence does not support Iran’s claims.
101
 Iran’s sometimes antagonistic and often 
contradictory behaviour towards the IAEA as well as those who are trying to use 
diplomacy to resolve the issue reinforces a general disbelief in Iran’s claims. The 
result is that the international community wants to be able to ensure that what Iran 
is actually saying is in fact the case. This could occur with IAEA monitoring all of 
Iran’s nuclear facilities and not allowing full cycle reprocessing to occur. Iran has 
been persuaded that it requires nuclear power and this has been internalised by its 
leaders and accepted by the international community. It is the potential linking of 
this programme to nuclear weapon development that is the issue. 
 
Israel has clearly not been persuaded to conform to the non-proliferation norm, in 
fact they are the opposite, while Iran is trying to convince a very sceptical 
international community that it has, even while much of the evidence does not 
support this claim. The result of the high degree of secrecy that surrounds the 
nuclear programmes in both countries is that there is no effective voice of dissent. 
In the cases of Sweden and Japan it was the role of domestic supporters of the non-
proliferation norm that played a critical role in influencing the decision makers not 
to proliferate. This was the case even though there was strong support for 
proliferation by elements of the elite.  
   
Identification as a rationale for forbearance is the existence of a hegemonic 
supporter; one that Iran or Israel would want to follow or is in the habit of following. 
The US is the only state that could be considered to fulfil this role for Israel. It is the 
US that has given tacit approval to Israel for its nuclear programme. The US has not 
put pressure on Israel to sign the NPT as long as it maintains its policy of opacity. 
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And, that it upholds its promise to not be the first state to “introduce” nuclear 
weapons into the Middle East. The relationship between the US and Israel is unique, 
complicated and contradictory all at the same time. The US has supplied Israel with 
conventional arms since soon after its creation. Israel is portrayed in the US as both 
the victim in the Israeli- Arab conflict, and a small country surrounded by enemies 
that want to destroy it because they question its legitimacy. It is because of this that 
the US believes it is supporting the underdog. The existence of these threats has 
resulted in Israel believing it is justified in both defending itself, which is a right of all 
states, and also in deterring future invasions through the possession of nuclear 
weapons.  
 
Israel emphasises that it is the only democracy in the Middle East and as a result is a 
natural ally of the west because of their shared values.
102
 Smooha’s writing on 
ethnic democracies which I have explained in my case study is a very different form 
of democracy, (with clear parallels to apartheid) as opposed liberal democracies 
which are found in the west. These distinctions are down played by Israel’s elites 
and if required to be justified are done so as being a necessary consequence of 
Israel’s security situation. The strong linkages to expatriate Jewish communities in 
the west generally, but in the US in particular, are another important element of the 
relationship. These linkages allow further voices to be heard outside as well as 
inside of official diplomatic channels.  
 
Mearsheimer and Walt’s book “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy” became very 
controversial for its attempts to explain this relationship.
103
 Their premise was that 
the US Israeli relationship was actually detrimental to US foreign interests in the 
Middle East and its own national security. They argue that because of the success of 
the influential “Israel lobby” subsequent administrations have continued to support 
Israel even when doing so went against US national interests. The US is the only 
hegemonic supporter that Israel actively listens to or could be made to listen to. If 
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the US put economic sanctions on Israel and/or stopped military aid in an attempt 
to make it comply with the non-proliferation norm, Israel would have to listen. The 
US is the only state that is in a position to do this. Whether it would work or not is 
another issue. The UN and other international institutions have not been effective in 
countering or reigning in Israel’s proliferation to date. The US, as one of the P-5, has 
used its power of veto to protect Israel at the UNSC in the past.  
 
Iran has no hegemonic supporter at a state level. It has closely watched what has 
happened to other countries as they have developed their nuclear programmes 
(DPRK, Pakistan and India) and learnt from their very different experiences. This is, 
however, a very different kind of relationship from that of a hegemonic supporter. It 
is the international community as a whole that Iran focuses on and it is this that 
could be thought of as its closest thing to a hegemonic supporter. Iran has put a 
concerted effort into increasing its standing in the eyes of the international 
community and dispelling its reputation as an ‘outlaw’, ‘pariah’ or ‘rogue’ state. 
Because the international community is not a consistent or homogeneous ally it 
cannot fulfil the role required to make identification a plausible outcome. Iran aligns 
itself only with causes in the Middle East, not specific states. It sees itself as a 
potential leader in the region so has not allowed itself to be influenced by others. 
Because of its revolutionary beginnings, alignment with another state would be 
seen as contradicting its revolutionary principles and undermining its own 
legitimacy. Chubin describes it as; 
“Normalisation and routinization of foreign policy necessitates jettisoning 
revolutionary claims, which are believed to be an intrinsic part of the regimes 
legitimacy. The revolutionary reflex competes with a detached pragmatism and 
often subverts it.”
104
 
This quote describes the complex and contradictory position of the Iranian regime 
and sheds some light on why the international community has had such difficulty in 
interacting with it and interpreting its often contradictory actions and statements. 
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For identification the US is the only possible hegemonic supporter that Israel would 
listen to in support of the non-proliferation norm. The US has not been prescriptive 
in requesting Israel to support the non-proliferation norm. Instead it has supported 
the policy of opacity and never pushed Israel on the issue. The US rationale for not 
doing so has never been clearly defined and in reality its motives will be fluid, 
however there is much speculation on these. More pressing issues of US foreign 
policy have always managed to eclipse the issue.
105
 The US’s approach to Israel has 
not gone unnoticed especially in the Middle East and remains a regularly referenced 
example of US foreign policy hypocrisy within the region. Iran does not have an 
hegemonic supporter and the closest one, by proxy, is the international community 
which is too fractured on the issue to act in that role. There is a clear connection 
between Iran and Israel and the US sheltering of the later adds to the Iranian 
resentment of the way it feels it is mistreated.  
 
An acceptance of a norm as a result of social conformity occurs when the state’s 
preference does not change, but their actions do, as a result of the desire to 
minimise the cost or maximise the benefit from following the norm. Israel, not 
following the norm, has had the reverse effect. The deterrent that has been 
achieved from proliferation has improved its security situation in the eyes of the 
decision makers. Domestically there has been no direct political cost to the decision 
makers for the decision to proliferate, which is largely a result of the taboo around 
even discussing it. Internationally, as discussed above there has also been minimal, 
if any, cost associated with this which is the result of the US’s tacit approval. 
Because Israel has never signed the NPT, it’s not breaking any laws (it is rejecting 
norms) with its possession of nuclear weapons. The majority of the members of the 
international community does not even raise the issue now largely because of 
Israel’s relationship with the US. States within the international community that do 
raise it never get sufficient support to bring it to the forefront of international 
debate as there are always more ‘pressing’ issues to focus on. Alternatively Israel is 
presented as a special case and because it is the only democracy in the region if 
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nothing else they are seen as being more trustworthy and hence pseudo-acceptable 
proliferators.
106
  
 
Iran’s cost benefit calculations are more subtle and require unpacking. Domestically 
nuclear power is seen as a means of improving the economy. The way in which 
Iran’s nuclear programme has developed has been decided by the elite to include 
full cycle reprocessing which opens the door to proliferation. This has been sold 
domestically as the best option because it provides self sufficiency  and thus does 
not rely on foreign support, which is something the Iranians know from experience 
can be withdrawn. Iran still needs to import the raw uranium but this is not 
emphasised domestically. Internationally there is great reluctance to allow Iran the 
full cycle option. Thus the cost benefit analysis for Iran hinges on how badly it wants 
the capability and whether it will accept the conditions dictated by the non-
proliferation regime in order to get it. The evidence all supports an answer of very 
badly to the first question and a question mark for the second. The cost to Iran in 
the international social environment of breaking with the non-proliferation regime 
would be very high, even unacceptable. Further, sanctions on a country that relies 
on oil and gas exports for a large part of its revenue would be debilitating. The 
world’s increasing demand for the same oil and gas would make this an action of 
last resort, if an option at all due to its potential impact on the world’s economy.  
 
Ideally the international community would like to see Iran persuaded to support the 
non-proliferation norm because if this was the case there could be a compromise on 
Iran’s demand for the full cycle option. Genuine persuasion would be hard to 
achieve without strong internal support from non-proliferation norm supporters as 
was the case in Japan and Sweden. It was achieved in Egypt according to Rublee’s 
findings because of the way in which Nasser reconceptualised security, accepting 
that diplomatic pressure against Israel was a powerful way to deal with an 
enemy.
107
 Iran does not currently have the same high international or regional 
standing that Egypt does, which it got, in part because of its decision to forgo the 
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nuclear option. Nasser made the decision against the wishes of a strong internal 
pro-proliferation group of elites.
108
   
 
The nature of Iran’s revolutionary regime makes this type of decision difficult while 
still appearing to remain faithful to revolutionary ideals. The cost benefit analysis is 
most powerful because Iran cannot afford to be a self imposed outsider and 
maintain and increase the standard of living expected by the Iranians. The 
emergence of an existential threat as was the case in the First Gulf War with Iraq 
could change this but this, is considered unlikely to eventuate in the current 
climate.
109
  
 
Recently the international community has watched how Iran has dealt with dissent 
over the outcome of the 2009 presidential elections with most hoping that political 
change would come from within. Political change is the only likely way in which Iran 
will effectively be persuaded to support the non-proliferation norm in a manner that 
would be acceptable to the non-proliferation regime. In a similar way to that of a 
state’s move to democracy, the most powerful force for this kind of large change 
has to come from within.
110
 
 
 Iran is watching and learning from the DPRK’s experience and although some key 
decision makers clearly want nuclear weapons it is not at any cost. Acceptance of 
the non-proliferation norm under Rublee’s social conformity label is a conceivable 
outcome for Iran although it is far from assured at present. Iran is most suited to the 
social conformity option because of its domestic pressures as well as the globally 
interconnected nature of its economy. The international community would need to 
define what exactly Iran needs to conform to and remain consistent in its demands 
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for this to be the case. It is the inconsistency of the international community that is 
playing into the hands of the Iranian elites that want to proliferate. It is the fear, 
which is best articulated by the realist view which see it simply as a stepping stone 
to proliferation, which makes social conformity acceptance difficult. The belief is 
that Iran will play the game of nuclear hedging. Once it gets the required technology 
it will then leave the NPT and pursue its proliferation aspirations. 
 
Germany is an interesting case study of Rublee’s because, while remaining a non-
proliferator, its reasoning for doing so changed. Originally it was social conformity 
through pressure from the US in the post World War II environment, but over time 
as this was internalised by the population and the ruling elites. The result was that 
both the elites and the general population was persuaded that non-proliferation 
was the best option. It has recently decided against any further nuclear power 
programmes and adopted a policy with the long term goal of becoming nuclear 
power free as well proliferation free. This decision has been made taking into 
consideration Germany’s proficiency at building and exporting nuclear power 
reactors and associated technology. This example emphasises the fluid nature of 
norm conformity and the changing rationale that can lie behind it. 
 
Israel’s situation is different. Social conformity would only be an outcome if 
persuasion or identification were to play a bigger role in the decision making 
process. For persuasion to be a possibility there would have to be an initial domestic 
debate on the issue. Some of the secrecy surrounding the decision making 
processes would also have to be removed. This would necessitate the end of the 
Israeli policy of opacity. Israel would need to join India and Pakistan as non NPT 
signatories who possess nuclear weapons. The result of doing this would be the 
public confirmation of what everyone already knows i.e. that Israel is a nuclear 
weapon state. Because it is already public knowledge it would be impossible to 
argue that this would decrease Israel’s security. Israeli nuclear weapon capability 
has only worked as a deterrent because Israel’s enemies knew it existed, so 
confirming this is unlikely to change anything.  
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This seemingly small action will likely have the effect of reinforcing the non-
proliferation norm by removing the grey area in the middle, which is what Israel has 
become because of its policy of opacity. Identification could also play a role. The US 
is the only state that could use pressure on Israel to end the policy of opacity. The 
sequence in which either of these events happen will have a definite impact on 
either domestic politics or US Israeli relations and this could be either positive or 
negative depending on how it is presented.
111
  It could be presented to the Iranians 
and the world by the US as an example of how they are making Israel more 
accountable or conversely by the Israeli’s as a gesture to Iran, although the later 
seems highly unlikely. Domestically it could be presented as an example of how the 
country has grown out of the opacity policy and into a better light internationally on 
the issue or that it wants to make these decisions more democratic. The options are 
as vast as the imagination of decision makers. The non-proliferation norm and the 
regime are clearly effective; the vast majority of states that follow it support this 
view. Why is it not working in the cases of Iran and Israel? I will now look at some 
external factors that could possibly be diluting the norm or overshadowing the 
norm. 
 
External influences for nuclear proliferation 
 
The main external influences I have identified are; economic considerations, access 
to technology, specific security situations, the processes by which the states were 
constructed and key decision makers. I will look at the impact that these influences 
have had on Rublee and my case studies to see if the offer alternative justifications 
for proliferation.   
  
The high economic cost of nuclear programmes, which was a big factor for Egypt, 
has not been a real consideration for either Iran or Israel. Iran with its huge oil and 
gas reserves has access to large quantities of foreign currency. Nuclear power is 
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seen as a way of being able to export more of these reserves and earn more foreign 
currency. 
 
 Israel has one of the highest GDP’s in the Middle East and is considered 
economically successful. The secrecy surrounding Israel’s nuclear programme makes 
it difficult to find out how much it has cost and how it was financed.  The initial 
funding was kept separate from the official budget to maintain secrecy and to avoid 
debate over this expenditure with other arms of government. According to Cohen’s 
research half of the 80 million (this is in 1960 US dollars) required to build the 
Dimona reactor was raised through private donations from around the world.
112
 It is 
fair to conclude that although the cost was great its perceived importance meant 
funding was found as and when it was required.  
  
Access to technology and the associated expertise was a major stumbling block for 
both Egypt and Libya in their quest for nuclear weapons. In the case of Israel, the 
simple answer was that this was not an issue. Israel sent students to western 
counties to be trained and they were allowed open access to France’s facilities as 
part of its assistance in the building of Dimona. Immigrating Jewish nuclear scientists 
from the former USSR were also employed by the nuclear programme.
113
 Today 
Israel has a well established and technologically advanced nuclear programme 
which has limited the attractiveness of the NPT as a means of accessing technology. 
The access to technology and personnel for peaceful nuclear purposes as laid out in 
the NPT is used as a carrot for state compliance. This is totally redundant because 
Israel already has all the required capability so has nothing to gain.
114
  
 
In the case of Iran, the programme was started by the Shah who also sent young 
scientists to the west to study. This stopped after the revolution and in more recent 
years Iran has had to look to China and Russia for the sale of nuclear power related 
technology as well as the training of its people. Neither of these countries wants 
                                                          
112
 ———, Israel and the Bomb. Pg 70. 
113
 Ibid. gives full details of when this occurred. 
114
 Kadhim, “The future of nuclear weapons in the Middle East”. Pg 150.  in Lavoy, Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation in the Next Decade. 
 59
Iran to have nuclear weapons so this limits what they are willing to sell them.
115
 Iran 
has a limited relationship with the DPRK and evidence supports the view that they 
share nuclear information. This includes as previously indicated Iranian scientists 
being present at the DPRK long range (nuclear warhead capable) missile launch in 
2006.
116
 Access or more correctly the lack of access to the required technology has 
definitely affected the speed at which Iran has been able to carry out its nuclear 
programme. The international community has actively and with some degree of 
success tried to make this as difficult as possible for Iran. This tactic worked partially 
in the past with Egypt and Libya both of whom accepted the non-proliferation norm. 
Neither of these countries had progressed very far and both were more focused on 
nuclear weapons acquisition than nuclear power production. This made their 
situation more black and white with regards to the non-proliferation regime.      
 
State’s security has been used as the justification for the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and the Cold War arm’s race is the most dramatic example of this. The 
argument goes that the deterrent effect achieved from the possession of nuclear 
weapons will prevent a non nuclear armed enemy from acts of aggression against 
one that is nuclear armed. The imbalance will work in favour of the state that is 
nuclear armed. To counter this, a potential aggressor will also need to be armed 
with nuclear weapons to counter the other state’s nuclear weapons. This then 
escalated to the requirement for a second strike capability, that is, one which is 
protected from the impact of a first strike (either submerged in a submarine or 
protected deep underground in protective bunkers) and allows the state to 
retaliate. One quickly sees that this strategy can go on forever and is limited only by 
finance. This sort of escalation will occur only if both states have nuclear weapons, 
otherwise the initial imbalance remains. It is the deterrent effect of nuclear 
weapons that some, mainly from the realist school, believe, will lead to a more 
stable international environment. By raising the stake of the consequence of state 
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aggression to the level nuclear weapons do, it will result in a decrease in this 
aggression because the consequences are too great.
117
  
 
Israel’s nuclear deterrent is thought to be effective by the decision makers because 
it has a monopoly on this deterrent in the region. Any change to this is believed to 
have the consequence of diminishing the effectiveness of the deterrent which will 
result in a worsening of Israeli’s security. This whole argument is based on a very 
narrow definition of security, one based solely on military capability. The state of 
Israel was literally born on the battlefield and over the first 25 years of its existence 
it fought in four wars with its immediate neighbours. The last of these was the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973. Since that time its relationship with its neighbours has actually 
improved. Egypt and Jordan and to a lesser extent Syria and Lebanon have, as a 
result of military defeat, chosen diplomacy over the battlefield as a way to work 
through their grievances. The close geographical proximity of these old enemies 
makes the use of nuclear weapons as being viable only as an option of last resort.  
 
The major security issue facing Israel comes from Palestinians dissatisfied with the 
failure of the two state settlement processes. A nuclear Israel has no deterrent 
effect on this situation. Iraq was seen as a threat and has even fired Scud missiles 
into Tel Aviv in the past. Iraq has since been removed from the equation, for the 
interim.  
 
Iran is one country that refuses to acknowledge Israel’s legitimacy as a state and its 
President Ahmadinejad, has called for Israel to be “wiped of the map”.
118
 This and 
other highly inflammatory remarks ensure that Israel watches Iran very closely. Iran 
has a Jewish minority and they have a member of parliament to represent them. 
Most of this sort of rhetoric although highly disturbing, is an emotive way of saying 
they support the Palestinian people’s struggle for a two state settlement and feel 
that the Palestinians are being unfairly treated. Toned down versions of the same 
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sentiment can be heard in almost all Middle Eastern capitals.
119
 If the Israelis could 
agree upon a workable two state settlement option many of the external threats 
would dissipate. Israel and Iran have no direct dispute with each other. Instead they 
each use the other as a focal point to draw attention away from themselves and 
their own actions.
120
 
 
Israel has mitigated its complex security situation, in part, by maintaining an 
asymmetrical nuclear weapon capability within the Middle East. It is this monopoly 
that Israel is focused on maintaining. Iran’s greatest security challenge comes from 
the US and the presence of US troops on three of its borders.
121
 Some of Iran’s 
revolutionary identity comes from its rejection of US hegemony. The decision 
makers reinforce their authority and the legitimacy of the revolutionary regime by 
emphasising the double standards in the way the US operates. The close proximity 
of the US military makes these decision makers nervous, which has resulted in them 
taking an even more confrontational and antagonistic position against the US.  
 
Assessing Iran’s security situation has led some to the conclusion that pursuing 
nuclear weapons is a rational way forward. Because of this the fact that Iran does 
not possess nuclear weapons should be interpreted as a sign of its self restraint.
122
 
In Iran and Israel their security environment has played and continues to play an 
important role this however is only part of the picture. 
 
In the case of Israel the key element is that the state was created out of the 
experience of the holocaust which itself was the culmination of thousands of years 
of differing forms of persecution in much of the world. Israel is seen as the one 
place that Jewish people can go to in order to be safe from persecution. In reaction 
to the horror of the holocaust the decision makers emphasised the need to be able 
to ensure that it could never happen again and made this a central part of the 
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state’s identity. Hand in hand with this has been the emphasis on Jewish Israel’s 
achieving this themselves, and by never having to rely on other states to assist. This 
has resulted in a very pragmatic approach to interactions with international 
institutions. They are viewed as being useful to a point, but there is a definite group 
of issues on which Israel will not compromise. In Iran’s case this is not so important. 
I have already described the effects of its revolutionary origins on its decision 
making process and the difficult balancing act that the rulers must play to both 
maintain legitimacy internally as well as relating to others internationally. This 
conflict also plays out domestically in the attempt to balance their great Persian 
history which was pre-Islamic with Islamic revolutionary ideals.   
 
The role that a handful of elites have played in the nuclear decisions of both 
countries is the final area I will discuss. The autocratic nature of the decision making 
process in both countries worked against both the non-proliferation norms and the 
associated regime’s effectiveness. The influence of both comes from discussion, 
openness and dialogue all of which have been limited in these two cases.  
 
Libya attempted to acquire nuclear weapons over a long period of time and then 
reversed its policy. Both decisions were made by the same authoritarian leader, 
Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi which makes it unique. In 2003 Qadhafi decided that it was in 
Libya’s best interest to accept the non-proliferation regime. The decision to do so 
was made in part by the fear that Libya could be the next US target after Iraq. This 
decision was also made knowing that it would have the flow on effect of improving 
the economy, through the lifting of sanctions, as well as elevating his and Libya’s 
standing within the international community. In this example the decision by Libya 
to align itself with the existing international non-proliferation norm strengthened its 
security situation, improved its economic situation and elevated its status 
internationally. 
123
 The small group of decision makers in each country has made the 
ability of the norms to influence their decisions more difficult but not impossible as 
Qadhafi has shown.   
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Economic considerations, access to technology, specific security situations, state 
construction and key decision makers have all played parts of the proliferation in 
Iran and Israel. Collectively they have weakened the non-proliferation regime and 
made each state’s elite less inclined to accept the associated norms. These however 
are not enough to explain Iran and Israel’s proliferation by themselves. The non-
proliferation regime has evolved over time. It is fluid enough to incorporate both 
countries as long as it is applied consistently. These external influences have played 
a part however they do not offer enough to explain proliferation. For every external 
influence that could be used to explain proliferation an example of a state can be 
found where non-proliferation has occurred. To treat state proliferation as the make 
or break of the whole non-proliferation regime is to deny its fluid nature and accept 
the ‘slippery slope’ analogy.         
  
The constructivist analysis of Iran and Israel’s proliferation clearly identifies possible 
policy approaches that would strengthen the non-proliferation norm. For example 
removing US import/export controls on Iran in favour of imposing IAEA guidelines 
for the movement of nuclear materials in and within Iran. Actions such as this 
reinforce the regime and its norms in an inclusive and standardised manner and 
help to remove Iran’s perception of persecution at the hands of the US. By actions 
such as this the norm is dissected, which facilitates a deeper understanding of the 
influence norms have and how they are received and perceived by states. By 
understanding this process the strengths and weaknesses of the norms are 
identified and can be compensated for. One of the key strengths of the norm is that 
it extrapolates above the level of the state into that of the international community. 
In doing this a more even handed approach can be taken than would ever be 
possible if the issue was being dealt with just between two states, as the US 
unilateral import/export restrictions have been.   
 
In the case of Iran without political change the only possible outcome will be social 
conformity. For this to happen, the international community must be unified in 
opposing (or at least deferring as long as possible) Iran’s ownership of a full cycle 
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reprocessing capability. Sanctions, if required, should be focused on punishing the 
elites not the general population. If political change occurs in Iran then genuine 
persuasion against the possession in support of the norms of nuclear weapons could 
be possible. This would occur if the result of the political change was either, a more 
democratic system, or one that was less confrontational like Libya has become. 
 
For Israel any change to their current policy of opacity would either have to come 
from within or from pressure from the US. The opening up of domestic debate on 
the nuclear issue would allow alternative points of view to be heard. This would be 
unlikely to result in any quick change to Israel’s nuclear position however it would 
the first step in doing so. Alternatively, the US could apply pressure to Israel to do 
the same. The outcome would be the same, what would change would be either 
Israel’s domestic politics or US/Israeli relations. These changes would either see an 
increase in the role of persuasion or identification in Israeli decision making. One or 
both of these changes needs to occur before social conformity could play a role.        
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Conclusion 
 
The non-proliferation regime and its norms have been the most successful 
influences on deterring states from proliferating nuclear weapons. The NPT, a 
central component of this is the most successful arms control treaty in world 
history. Rublee used a constructivist approach to explain why states have shown 
nuclear restraint in support of the regime and its norms. I have attempted to use 
the same approach to see what it can tell us about states that don’t conform to 
these norms and proliferate nuclear weapons. Rublee used Germany, Egypt, Libya, 
Sweden and Japan as case studies of states that have shown restraint. I have used 
Iran and Israel as my case studies for states that are not or have not shown 
restraint. Iran is in the process of covertly developing nuclear weapons, and is doing 
so by disguising it true motives behind an constantly changing interpretation of the 
NPT. Israel has had nuclear weapons for over 40 years yet still refused to officially 
acknowledge this fact. By doing this they are rejecting and undermining the non-
proliferation norms, which makes it harder to enforce it on other states without 
appearing hypocritical.  
 
A State’s decision to proliferate or not can and does change. Because this is the case 
it is important to know why states make the decisions that they do in order to 
influence a change of outcome. It is important to understand the role that norms 
play in shaping state this decision making. Constructivism breaks up the process by 
which norms are received by states and accepted or rejected into transmission, 
processing and potency. The result of breaking it down to this level is that as things 
change we can see the impacts they will have on these norms and attempt to 
counter any negative outcomes.  
 
The three state outcomes of persuasion, Identification and social conformity allow 
us to explore how committed to the norms different states are. In the cases of Iran 
and Israel they allow us to see what would have to change in order for one or more 
of these to become an outcome for the two states. The way in which the norm has 
been received by the two countries is different. Iran gets an inconsistent set of 
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expectations from the international community while Israel gets almost no 
expectations placed upon it by the very same international community. On the 
surface it appears that this is the case because Israel is not a NPT signatory but in 
reality it is their special relationship with the US and the protection from the 
scrutiny of the international community that this brings on the nuclear issue. The 
NPT is designed as an unequal treaty which separates the nuclear weapon haves 
from the have-nots. The countries that have signed it have had to accept this. The 
position Israel has taken is one that is unique in that its nuclear status in undeclared. 
Israel has been allowed to gain the benefits from the wider regime without having 
to submit to any of its conditions. By looking at its specific situation through the 
constructivist framework this has been made very clear, as has the negative impacts 
of this on the regime and norm. This insight would have been difficult, if to acquire 
from either a realist or neo-liberal institutionalist perspective only.  
 
For Iran the norm has been ineffectual because it has been transmitted 
inconsistently from a fractured international community. If this was to happen to 
almost any other state they would have another country or group of countries who 
could assist them with defining what is best to do. Iran is not in this situation. This is 
exacerbated by the Islamic and revolutionary nature of the state. In the west, the 
separation of religion and the state is seen as a fundamental part of what is to be 
modern, and revolutions are seen as ways of achieving this separation. Therefore 
the Iranian revolution did the structural opposite, of what the west defines as being 
required to being a modern state. This was done while simultaneously possessing all 
of the trappings which are expected of a modern state. The difficulty countries have 
in dealing with Iran has resulted in conflicting expectations from these countries 
being placed on Iran. The elite have taken advantage of this to pursue their 
proliferation ambitions within the confusion. Iran’s difficult relationship with the US 
has become a tool to divide the international community, much of which is unhappy 
with how Iraq and Afghanistan are working out.                      
 
My study has focused on the non-proliferation norm however this constructivist 
approach could be used to examine other international regimes. Combining this 
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with realist and neo-liberal institutionalist explanations builds a more rounded 
explanation for explaining proliferation and non-proliferation.  By deconstructing 
the why and how it is much easier to ascertain how to change undesired outcomes. 
The constructivist approach acknowledges the ability of states to change position 
over time, and lays out a framework explaining why this is so.  
 
There exists a grey area between nuclear power generation and nuclear weapon 
development and it is here that role of the non-proliferation norms are most 
important. By understanding how norms operate a better explanation for 
proliferation as well as non-proliferation can be provided. Rublee’s framework has 
shown itself to be robust enough to assist in the explanation of state non-
conformity to non-proliferation norms. 
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